Institutional Persuasion to Support Rights in Russia

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Abstract: Public support for minority rights plays an important role in minorities actually securing and protecting those rights. In countries like Russia where public support for minority rights is low, how can attitudes be changed? Our research shows that institutions such as the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and State Duma have the potential to persuade about a quarter of otherwise intolerant Russians to move toward supporting rights. We seek to explain this important shift among this subpopulation. Paradoxically, we find that a usually unpalatable characteristic, deference to authority, among the intolerant is significantly related to their potential to be persuaded to support rights.

Can authorities persuade the public to support minority rights? Are there certain characteristics that make some individuals more amenable to persuasion than others? These questions are particularly important in countries such as Russia that are "between dictatorship and democracy" (McFaul, Petrov, and Ryabov 2004). The Russian public has traditionally not been very supportive of minority rights, so there is currently very little public pressure for compliance with court decisions that grant rights or public support for political candidates who promote minority rights. Instead, the illiberal attitudes of the Russian public presumably enable the illiberalness of the Russian state, which has become something of an "elected monarchy" (Shevtsova 2002) or "autocracy endorsed by the people" (Petukhov and Ryabov 2004). Prime Minister Putin can violate rights in the name of preserving order and still be wildly popular.

We seek to understand whether and how this situation could change and the public come to support minority rights. We hypothesize that one key to the puzzle may be found in an individual characteristic usually considered undesirable for rights protections, deference to authority. Deference to authority has often been cited as reason for pessimism about the prospects for democracy in Russia, so it may seem paradoxical to suggest the reverse. However, we suspect that, to the extent that Russian courts and other institutions are perceived as authorities and to the extent that they choose to use their authority to protect minority rights, deference to authority may be harnessed in the service of cultivating the desirable characteristics, tolerance and support for minority rights. We test this hypothesis using data from three surveys of more than 6,000 Russians each. We find that Russians who initially denied rights to minorities but who could be persuaded by courts to grant rights are also those most deferential to authority.

(Lack of) support for minority rights among the Russian public

Studies since the collapse of the Soviet Union consistently reveal high levels of intolerance among the Russian public (Gibson and Duch 1993; Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon 1997; Gibson 1998a, 1998b; Baird and Javeline 2007). Russians would quite readily deny rights to fascists, Stalinists, nationalists, and other widely disliked political minorities. They would also quite

readily deny rights to disliked nonpolitical minorities like homosexuals, Jews, and Jehovah's Witnesses. Russians consistently state preferences for order and stability over the freedoms associated with democracy (Gibson 1997). In a 2000 poll, 81 percent of respondents said order was more important for Russia than democracy and that "in pursuit of this priority, the violation of certain democratic principles and the restriction of individual liberties were fully acceptable" (Petukhov and Ryabov 2004:286). In some countries, intolerance is relatively unthreatening because it is "pluralistic," or dispersed among a variety of targets with no one minority being disliked by an overwhelming majority (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Shamir and Sullivan 1983). In Russia, intolerance is mostly dispersed across different groups, but research has also revealed some particularized or focused intolerance, which could bode poorly for the future of rights protections in the country (Gibson and Duch 1993).

Few argue that Russians want an extreme authoritarian government. Studies since the collapse of the Soviet Union reveal intolerance but also widespread support for specific democratic institutions and processes (Dobson and Grant 1992; Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992; Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992; Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1991, 1993; Gibson and Duch 1993; Gibson 1996; Rose and Munro 2002:61-81). Russians endorse competitive elections, and they value the political freedoms gained since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Support for democracy and intolerance coexist, and not just in the aggregate, but within individuals: Even staunch supporters of democracy in Russia would deprive some minorities of rights (Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon 1997; Gibson 1998a). The intolerance of these democrats may reflect not a general unwillingness to grant minority rights, but a realistic concern over the threat that a particular minority, such as fascists, poses to democracy (Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon 1997).

That democrats are as likely to be intolerant as anti-democrats could be cause for pessimism about the future of rights protections in Russia. However, there also may be cause for optimism: "Intolerance does not seem to be embedded in a deeper anti-democratic belief system. …Because these intolerant attitudes are not well integrated, they are potentially manipulable, perhaps even toward a more democratic direction" (Gibson 1998a). We explore this possibility.

Becoming supportive of minority rights

How might the Russian public move from point A to point B, illiberal to liberal, intolerant to tolerant? Prior research suggests that this move is unlikely because Russia, like many other postcommunist countries, ranks low on variables shown to correlate significantly with tolerance development. For example, publics can become more tolerant by witnessing examples of elite cooperation and compromise. These examples serve as concrete evidence that the system can endure even potentially threatening groups and that tolerance will not backfire (Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon 1997). Unfortunately for supporters of minority rights in Russia, the country currently boasts few such examples of elite cooperation and compromise. If anything, executive power has increased over the last decade at the expense of political competition and independent media so that whatever give-and-take occurs does so either hidden from view or among low ranked and relatively powerless adversaries.

Education is usually seen as a key vehicle for encouraging tolerance (Stouffer 1955; Nunn, Crocket, and Williams 1978; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982; cf. Bobo and Licari 1989), but its effects depend critically on whether the prevailing values in the country and its educational system emphasize minority rights and the importance of tolerance (Weil 1985). In Russia, such emphasis is minimal, so the direct effect of education on tolerance development is also minimal (Gibson and Duch 1993). Individual demographic characteristics like youth, urban residency, and male gender have been associated with greater tolerance (Stouffer 1955; Nunn, Crocket, and Williams 1978; Weil 1991), although there may simply be demographic differences in likes and dislikes rather than tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982). Moreover, even if demographic characteristics were incontrovertibly significant for tolerance, they are difficult if not impossible to manipulate and so offer little guidance for tolerance development.

The perception of threat is a well-known correlate of (in)tolerance, suggesting that reducing the actual or perceived threat of adversaries should encourage tolerance (Stouffer 1955; Marcus et al. 1995). This is a reasonable yet difficult path, especially since reducing threat perceptions may depend on variables already mentioned, like tolerance education and elite cooperation, that

are in short supply. Support for democratic values, as stated earlier, certainly does not harm the development of tolerance, but nor do democratic values ensure tolerance. To the extent that personality and cultural characteristics have been analyzed as sources of tolerance development, scholars have focused on interpersonal trust and openmindedness versus dogmatism. More trusting and openminded individuals will be less likely to reject groups or ideas different from their own (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Gibson and Duch 1993). Like reducing threat perceptions, increasing trust and openmindedness is a worthwhile but challenging path toward tolerance development and one that seems almost tautological, for if we knew how to increase interpersonal trust and openmindedness, presumably we would also have some insights into how to increase tolerance.

Based on this existing research, tolerance development in Russia would seem to be a losing proposition. The question remains: Are there any variables in Russia that are in large supply and relatively easy to manipulate that could potentially be useful in encouraging greater tolerance? We propose that an understudied but much maligned characteristic, deference to authority, might be such a variable, when coupled with the presence of an authoritative institution that is encouraging tolerance.

Institutional persuasion to support rights

Who should be most persuaded by institutions to support minority rights? Perhaps the place to look for clues is not in the correlates of tolerance but in the correlates of persuadability. Among intolerant Russians, whose attitudes in a general sense are most subject to change?

The strength and relevance of attitudes should obviously play a role in persuadability. The literature on persuasion shows that people are more persuadable when they are initially less certain about their ideas (Zuwerink and Devine 1996; Holland, Verplanken, and van Knippenberg 2003; Petrocelli, Tormala, and Rucker 2007). They are also more persuadable when an attitude is not fundamentally linked to their identities (Holland, Verplanken, and van Knippenberg 2003) and when they receive a lot of information about an only moderately salient issue (Mondak 1990, 1992; Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Hoekstra 2003). Thus, among intolerant

Russians, the most easily persuaded to support minority rights should be those with less extreme intolerant views that are not central to their concept of themselves or to their daily lives.

The literature on persuasion also shows that people are *less* persuadable when they believe that there is social support for their ideas and when they interact in social networks composed of likeminded individuals (Visser and Mirabile 2004; Petrocelli, Tormala, and Rucker 2007). Thus, among intolerant Russians, the most easily persuaded to support minority rights should be those who are unsure whether their views are shared and whose social networks are diverse. Unfortunately for supporters of minority rights in Russia, however, intolerance is commonly and correctly perceived as the majority viewpoint in the country, a factor that has been shown to work against tolerance development (Gibson 1998a).

In terms of persuasion specifically by institutions, trust in those institutions or elites should matter (Hibbing and Alford 2004; Darmofal 2005). If the institutions or elites grant minority rights, more trusting intolerant Russians should be the most easily persuaded to support these rights. Unfortunately again for supporters of minority rights in Russia, trust in Russian institutions has been sorely lacking. When given a list of ten institutions in 1993, the average Russian expressed distrust in seven of them (Rose 1994). Some of these attitudes may be changing –for example, recent evidence shows that the Russian public increasingly uses and respects the judicial system (Solomon and Foglesong 2000; Machura 2003; Popova 2006; Javeline and Baird 2007)—but the future of support for minority rights might still look bleak if it depended exclusively on the continuation of attitudinal changes ultimately resulting in widespread trust of Russian institutions.

A more optimistic finding from the persuasion literature is that people often respond to elite cues (McGuire 1969; Zaller 1992; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). This simple insight might seem to restate the finding that trust in institutions leads to persuasion, but here, trust is not a necessary part of the picture. People may respond to elite cues because they trust the elites, but they also may respond for entirely different reasons, like that the cues face no competition when all elites agree (Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Credibility of the

source cue can play a role in persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1983; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Carmines and Kuklinski 1990; Mondak 1990; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991),[1] and certainly credibility can originate from trust, but we propose that credibility may originate elsewhere as well.

Specifically, elite cues may be credible if they come from an authoritative, even if distrusted, source. This proposition may seem unpalatable –and indeed even antidemocratic and proauthoritarian—but perhaps it need not be. If a public is already inclined to defer to authority, then perhaps a realistic path toward persuading them to hold tolerant views is to capitalize on this usually unpalatable but abundant characteristic. In the hands of elites who themselves support minority rights (and only in those hands), deference to authority may actually come to serve liberal democratic ends.

Deference to authority

Our concept of deference to authority shares some characteristics with the traditional concept of the authoritarian personality, but we define deference to authority more narrowly. The authoritarian personality was said to involve faith in powerful leaders, extreme cynicism, suspicion and distrust of others, dogmatism, collectivism, paternalism, a preference for order over conflict, and an aversion to constraints on the exercise of power (Adorno et al. 1950; Diamond 1999:167-8). Deference to authority is a disposition to yield to the will of powerful leaders, and especially to consider the will of leaders as more worthy of respect than the will of the person himself or herself and the public. Deference to authority should not be taken to mean a preference for authoritarian government. Rather, it is submissiveness to leadership, whether authoritarian or democratic.

Deference to authority is not a disposition usually associated with a democratic political

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[1] Evidence on what kinds of cues and sources matter is mixed (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia 2002; Druckman and Lupia 2006; Bovitz, Druckman and Lupia 2002; Chong and Druckman, forthcoming).

culture, so it may seem counterintuitive that deference to authority could be harnessed in service to liberal democratic ends like support for minority rights. Democrats, after all, should have a responsible and watchful attitude toward authority, not a submissive one (Diamond 1999: 167-8). Democrats should value their rights and dignity, which would imply a questioning rather than yielding relationship with authority.

Beyond being simply antidemocratic, deference to authority can be downright insidious, leading to crimes of obedience like Nazi attempts to annihilate Jews and the My Lai massacre.

> "[W]hen acts of violence are explicitly ordered, implicitly encouraged, tacitly approved, or at least permitted by legitimate authorities, people's readiness to commit or condone them is enhanced. …In an authority situation, individuals characteristically feel obligated to obey the orders of the authorities, whether or not these correspond with their personal preferences. …Often people obey without question even though the behavior they engage in may entail great personal sacrifice or great harm to others" (Kelman and Hamilton 1989; see also Milgram 1963, 1974).

Given these potentially pernicious effects, supporters of minority rights may worry that deference to authoritative leaders could jeopardize rights if the leaders themselves are unsupportive of rights. The worry would have foundation, since elites may at times hold less tolerant attitudes than the mass public (Gibson and Duch 1991:206).

In Russia, deference to authority is usually seen as the Achilles heel for liberal democracy. Although Russians favor many aspects of a democratic political system, and most do not want an authoritarian government, they consistently express preferences for strong leadership that may seem to push the limits of what democracy would allow. Russians are said to have a "highly personalized attachment to political authority" (White 1979:30) and need a "powerful leader willing and capable of taking the fate of the country and its people into his or her hands" (Bova 1998:182; also Szamuely 1974). Some claim that there is "no getting away from the predominantly authoritarian nature of the Soviet and Russian political experience" (Brown 1989:18).

Only 28 percent of Russians surveyed in 1995 rejected all three authoritarian alternatives presented to them: army rule, a return to communist rule, and "to get rid of Parliament and elections in favor of a strong leader who can quickly decide everything" (Diamond 1999:184). A majority (51%), compared to an average of 24% in seven countries of central and east Europe, supported terminating parliament and elections in favor of a strong leader (Diamond 1999:186). A majority (50%) in 1997 also agreed that "Participation of the people is not necessary if decision making is left in the hands of a few trusted, competent leaders," and a full 85 percent agreed that "Russia needs strong leadership more than it needs democracy" (Hesli 2007:117). Quite sizable minorities in 1998 and 2001 (36% and 34%, respectively) agreed that "A tough dictatorship is the only way out of the current situation" and "In some situations an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one" (Rose and Munro 2002:79, 234).[2] As long as the public retains the power to throw out the government, many Russians see little need for public consultation in the policymaking process (Reisinger 1998:170) and are happy to defer to authority.[3]

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[2] The latter statement was chosen, not in an agree-disagree format, but over two alternative statements, "Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government" and "It doesn't matter to people like me whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic government."

[3] There are, of course, nondeferential elements of the Russian character, including the dual personality developed as far back as tsarist Russia and exaggerated in the Soviet era, whereby "individuals pay lip service to approved values while scoffing at them in action" (Colton 1988:154; see also Shlapentokh 1989). The nondeferential elements are usually considered secondary to the dominant authoritarian culture (Eckstein 1998:372), although some Russia specialists claim that the alternative culture or "goal culture" has been underappreciated and actually more dominant than the authoritarian culture (Petro 1997). We need not take sides in this debate, since (1) our question is about a specific attitude, support for rights, rather than the Russian culture as a whole, and (2) we fully appreciate the variability of

We propose that this deference to authority might be an asset as well as a liability. There is a long tradition dating back to Almond and Verba (1963) that recognizes the need for some deference in a democracy. Dispositions toward authority should be balanced, so that the participant role of citizens in a democracy is mixed with the political subject role (acceptance of political authority) and parochial role (ties to traditional, nonpolitical groups). In this way, authority should be questioned and challenged, but also supported (Diamond 1999:168).

We are not promoting deference to authority or judging deference to be normatively advantageous or even acceptable. Rather, we are acknowledging the reality of one aspect of Russian political culture, deference to authority, and positing whether any good can come out of the situation.

Few studies have shown systematically how the three components of Almond and Verba's civic culture actually facilitate democracy. Here, we focus on the seemingly uncivic component of the civic culture, the political subject role, and test whether a greater acceptance of or even reverence for authority can, in certain circumstances, actually be a boon for liberal democracy. We hypothesize that the higher the deference to authority, the more likely a liberal decision by an authoritative institution like a court or legislature could increase support for minority rights.

Support for legalism and rule of law

Factors besides deference to authority should help explain persuasion by courts or another authoritative institution to support minority rights. For example, research shows that many people prioritize concerns for procedural justice over other justice concerns (Tyler et al. 1997; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Such individuals should be more inclined to part with their initial attitudes if so dictated by procedures that they perceive to be legitimate and fair. Among those who initially oppose minority rights, supporters of legal procedures should be more willing

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deference to authority among the Russian public, and our goal is to test whether this variability is relevant to attitude change.

to accept a decision contrary to their initial preferences and be persuaded to support minority rights precisely because they favor the procedures that brought about the distasteful law. We therefore hypothesize that the greater the support for legalism and the rule of law, the more likely a pro-rights court or legislative decision could increase support for minority rights.

Trust in government

Trust in government may also matter. Trust in the specific government institutions making decisions to support rights should indicate that those institutions are perceived as legitimate, which matters for persuasion because legitimacy bolsters the credibility of the tolerance cue. The legitimate institution can thus serve as a heuristic or shortcut (Mondak 1990; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998). More generally, "Allowing rights to potentially threatening groups requires some faith that government is fair and effective—that it can mediate political conflicts successfully" and has the capacity and commitment to protect people (Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon 1997:491). However, the statistical evidence is so far mixed on whether trust in the Russian government affects tolerance, perhaps because political distrust has been so widespread in Russia that there has not been enough variance to test the hypothesis adequately (Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon 1997:495). To our knowledge, there is also as yet no statistical evidence on whether trust in specific institutions in the Russian government can facilitate persuasion to support minority rights. Nevertheless, the theoretical rationale for expecting trust in government to affect institutional persuasion is compelling. We therefore hypothesize that the greater the trust in institutions such as the judicial system as a whole, Supreme Court, Duma, and Prime Minister Putin, the more likely a pro-rights court or legislative decision could increase support for minority rights.[4]

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[4] The idea that Prime Minister Putin could inspire support for minority rights might sound counterintuitive to those who believe the policies of the Putin years have been hostile to rights. In the event of a pro-rights court or legislative decision, however, Russians may well attribute the pro-rights

Other attitudes

Other attitudes that may play a role in persuasion to support rights include the perceived exclusion from majority views, liberal attitudes, initial attitude weakness, and being generally unopinionated. As described earlier, the perception that one's intolerant views are shared by a majority of others should act as a counterweight to an institutional decision opposing this majority view, a counterweight unavailable to intolerant individuals who believe they are in the attitudinal minority. Intolerant individuals who hold liberal democratic or pro-rights attitudes on other issues may find these views in conflict and, when presented with a pro-rights court or legislative decision, be more open to persuasion. Intolerant individuals who are less passionately anti-rights at the outset should also be more open to persuasion, as should be individuals who are generally unopinionated about many issues. Thus we hypothesize that the lower the perception of shared views, the more liberal on other political attitudes, the weaker the initial conviction about intolerance, and the more uncertain about political attitudes in general, the more likely an intolerant Russian could be persuaded to support minority rights.

Personality characteristics

Personality characteristics like optimism, self-efficacy, and lack of hostility may also matter for determining an initially intolerant person's openness to being persuaded. Optimism has been found to be associated with persuasion in general (Geers, Handley, and McLarney 2003), and like trust in institutions, optimism may buffer the fear of granting rights to disliked groups, since the intolerant but generally optimistic person may not worry so much about the ramifications of the exercise of rights by the disliked group. Conversely, the intolerant and generally hostile individual may be more cynical about these ramifications and cautious about altering the playing

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decision to Putin or believe the decision has his blessing, so we hypothesize that Putin supporters may find the decision persuasive. The hypothesis turns out not to be supported by the empirical evidence presented below.

field in favor of other individuals generally and disliked groups in particular. For self-efficacy, or the perceived ability to cope and control outcomes in daily life, our expectation is mixed. On the one hand, self-efficacy could operate like optimism and make the intolerant individual less fearful of the ramifications of granting rights to disliked groups. On the other hand, self-efficacy could suggest a confidence in one's own opinions and abilities and make the intolerant individual less open to persuasion. We therefore hypothesize that the greater the optimism about the future and the lower the hostility, the more likely a pro-rights court or legislative decision could increase support for minority rights. The greater the self-efficacy, the more likely is persuasion to support rights, although we expect the impact to be low.

Demographic factors

We also consider hypotheses about demographics like age, religiosity, income, gender, and education. Among the initially intolerant, younger, less religious, and poorer Russians should be more likely to be persuaded to support minority rights, presumably because they have greater tendencies toward uncertainty and openmindedness rather than dogmatism (Gibson 1998b). Female and less educated Russians have been hypothesized elsewhere to be less tolerant, although the statistical evidence suggests only indirect effects on tolerance through variables like dogmatism and illiberalism that are themselves correlated with tolerance (Gibson and Duch 1993).

Data and Method

To test our hypotheses, we conducted three surveys in 2003, 2004, and 2005 in Russian cities with populations greater than 350,000, with the goal of generalizing to urban Russia, where most Russians live. The surveys were designed by us, commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development, and conducted by a Moscow-based survey research firm, the Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI). Response rates were extremely high (at least

67%), and the resulting sample sizes were 6,074 in 2003, 6,043 in 2004, and 6,044 in 2005.[5] We measure baseline attitudes toward a widely disliked group in Russia, Jehovah's Witnesses,[6] and then measure acceptance of contrary decisions by three different institutional source cues: the Russian Supreme Court, the Russian Constitutional Court, and the lower house of the Russian

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[5] Approximately 500 respondents were selected at random for face-to-face interviews in each of the following twelve cities each year: Moscow (adult population of 8.6 million), St. Petersburg (3.8 million), Nizhny Novgorod (1.1 million), Novosibirsk (1.1 million), Samara (946,000), Rostov-na-Donu (867,000), Chelyabinsk (853,000), Perm (796,000), Saratov (712,000), Khabarovsk (469,000), Irkutsk (458,000), and Tomsk (389,000). Cities were stratified into several geographic/administrative units (urban raioni). Primary sampling units (PSUs) and sampling points were electoral districts. Electoral districts were selected at random using the method of probability proportionate to the size of the electorate (adult population 18 years or older). Within each electoral district, households were selected from a total list of households using a random digit procedure, and individuals were selected randomly using Kish grids. The final sample contained 607 sampling points in 2003 and 598 sampling points in 2004 and 2005, with approximately 10 interviews per sampling point. In 2003, the overall response rate was 68 percent of the 8,985 targeted individuals, or 6,074 respondents. In 2004, the overall response rate was 69 percent of the 8,805 targeted individuals, or 6,043 respondents. In 2005, the overall response rate was 67 percent of the 9,000 targeted individuals, or 6,044 respondents. Survey questions were written by [[authors]] in consultation with USAID's Moscow branch and CESSI. The Russian translation was prepared by CESSI and checked by [[author]] and USAID. The resulting data were weighted for city size and regions within a city, as well as gender and age to correct for a slight overrepresentation of women and older Russians typical of surveys in Russia.

[6] See Gibson and Duch (1991) for a similar strategy of using fascists as the target group for all respondents. See [[citation]] for a description of the historic and widespread discrimination against Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia that make them a reasonable target group to choose for this experiment.

legislature, the Duma.

Here we attempt to understand the minority of Russians who initially preferred to deny rights to Jehovah's Witnesses but who could be persuaded by a court or legislative decision to support rights. Our dependent variable is thus persuasion to support rights, defined as a change in opinion in the direction of a pro-rights court or legislative decision. The initial question reads:

> *Some people think Jehovah's Witnesses are a religious cult that presents a danger to Russian society and should be forbidden from distributing literature on the street. Other people think that, regardless of whether they present a danger to Russian society, Jehovah's Witnesses should have the right to distribute literature on the street. Which view is closer to your own? Do you feel this way strongly or only somewhat?*

More than half of urban Russians surveyed (55.1%, 55.6%, and 59.9% in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively) replied that Jehovah's Witnesses should be forbidden from distributing literature, with the vast majority feeling this way very strongly. Their followup question reads:

Suppose the [Supreme Court/Constitutional Court/Duma] rules that Jehovah's Witnesses have the right to distribute literature on the street. To what extent would you agree with the [Court's/Duma's] decision? strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree

Half the respondents were asked about the Supreme Court in each year (2003, 2004, and 2005), while the other half were asked about the Constitutional Court in 2003 and the Duma in 2004 and 2005. We intentionally did not provide information on the arguments the institution used when making its hypothetical decision, only the fact that the decision was made. Our method thus more closely resembles a test of the effects of source credibility (Mondak 1990) than the effects of exposure to opposing arguments (Gibson 1998b). We are testing which intolerant Russians can be persuaded to support minority rights simply because institutions are

said to hold countervailing ideas.[7]

Both the initial baseline question on policy preferences toward Jehovah's Witnesses and the follow-up question that stated an institutional decision counter to the respondent's initial policy preference were measured with five-point scales (strongly anti-rights to strongly pro-rights for the former and strongly agree to strongly disagree for the latter, with moderate opinions and "don't know" falling in between). Persuasion is measured by the difference between the two survey questions (-2 = strengthened initial anti-rights position two steps, -1 = strengthened one step, 0 = no change, 1 = persuaded one step in the direction of the pro-rights decision, 2 = persuaded two steps, 3 = persuaded three steps, and 4 = persuaded four steps).

[Table 1 here]

Table 1 shows the distribution of Russians who initially preferred to forbid Jehovah's Witnesses from distributing literature on the streets (*N* = 10,314 across all three years) or who were initially unsure whether to forbid or allow rights (*N* = 2,559 across all three years) and who were then presented with a contrary, pro-rights institutional decision.[8] The most common outcome is for intolerant Russians to retain their initial anti-rights policy preference (67%), but a small minority of anti-rights Russians (about 25% in 2003, 2004, and 2005) could be persuaded in the direction of a pro-rights institutional decision. Persuasion three or four steps in the direction of the pro-rights decision is exceedingly rare (2% each), but persuasion one or two steps occurs for an important minority (16%) and (5%).

Most of these people were not persuaded to abandon their intolerance entirely and switch positions, but they were at least persuaded to be less fervent about their intolerance. Each year, among Russians who initially preferred to forbid rights to Jehovah's Witnesses and then heard

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[7] In future research we look at what causes tolerant Russians to be persuaded to exhibit intolerance.

[8] Of the initial 12,873 forbidders or uncertain respondents, 114 did not answer the follow-up question, so their ability to be persuaded could not be measured.

about a contrary institutional decision, only 7 to 8 percent were fully persuaded and changed their preferences to agree with the institution's decision to grant rights. Between 2 and 6 percent answered "don't know," suggesting they were persuaded to abandon their initial intolerant position but not to agree with the institution, and a consistent 13 percent still preferred to forbid rights but felt less strongly about it.[9] Understanding this minority of intolerant yet persuadable Russians may hold a key to understanding tolerance development in general.

A reasonable concern is whether the responses to the above questions measure genuine persuasion. The questions appear in succession, so the mission of the questions may be quite transparent to most respondents, who could provide the socially desirable response of agreeing with an institutional decision to an interviewer yet fail to hold that attitude only a short time later. We did not track respondents' opinion change or stability after the survey and thus cannot directly address this concern with our data. However, even the short term profession of persuasion is highly critical when assessing the prospects for rights protection. Respondents who profess persuasion to support rights during the interview may not retain that opinion outside the interview setting, but they are also unlikely to punish an elected official outside the interview setting for pursuing pro-rights policies. Rather, the response to a pro-rights court decision and pro-rights legislation by intolerant but persuadable respondents would, in the real world, probably be pro-rights acquiescence. Though not as helpful as pro-rights enthusiasm, public acquiescence to rights can still represent meaningful strides for rights protection.

[Table 2 here]

Our key explanatory variable is *Deference to authority*, measured with the three questions

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[9] Respondents who initially expressed uncertainty about granting or denying rights to Jehovah's Witnesses were asked the same followup question as those who initially preferred to deny rights. Our inclusion of uncertain respondents should have made persuasion to tolerate more likely, yet it proved difficult for institutions to persuade even this diluted category of intolerant Russians.

described in Table 2. These measures tap different dimensions of deference to authority. The first sets the bar rather high, since respondents are asked if they would yield to the will of some anonymous leader whose credentials they do not know and with unclear ramifications, should the leader do what he considers necessary without regard for citizens' opinions and his actions prove detrimental. The second and third measures set the bar lower, tapping into submissiveness by asking respondents to compare the competence of leaders for governing with their own competence and the competence of other ordinary Russians. Because the second and third measures turn out to be highly correlated (.49, $p < .01$, $N = 18{,}161$), we include only the first and second measure in multivariate analysis, using the third measure for corroborative evidence. As Table 2 shows, only a minority of Russians could be categorized as deferential by the high standards of the first measure, while the vast majority of Russians could be categorized as deferential by the second two measures.

[Table 3 here]

Table 3 describes the measurement of our remaining variables generated from the hypotheses above. A few measures are worthy of elaboration. For *Trust in government*, we test the relationship to persuasion of trust in several institutions, the judiciary in general/courts, Supreme Court, Duma, and Prime Minister Putin, since it is both theoretically and empirically important to understand the independent effects of each. For *Optimism*, we include two measures to tap into the concept as a general personality characteristic and as economic assessments. For *Liberalism*, we measure preference for freedom over order, opposition to censorship of extremist political ideas, and opposition to censorship in the name of presidential power. However, the second and third measures prove highly correlated, so we use only the first and second in multivariate analysis and the third for corroborative evidence.

Results

[Table 4 here]

The first column in Table 4 shows the results of an ordered logit conducted on our seven category dependent variable representing institutional persuasion to support rights (-2 to 4). It is

a limited model to test for the effects of the two deference measures while controlling only for the strength of the respondent's initial intolerance. The analysis lends strong support to the hypothesis that deference to authority can facilitate persuasion. The more strongly a person thinks a political leader should follow his own instincts even if citizens disagree, the more likely that person is to be persuaded by an institutional decision to support rights. The more competent a person considers political leaders relative to himself or herself to make decisions about governing of the country, the more likely that person is to be persuaded by an institutional decision to support rights. The latter statement is also true if we ask about the competence of political leaders relative to ordinary people (substituting *Deference to authority III* for *Deference to authority II* in the analysis).

The hypothesis is further supported when controlling for a wide range of other variables in the model (second column of Table 4). Believing a political leader should follow his instincts over citizen wishes remains positively and significantly related to persuasion to support rights. Believing leaders are more competent than yourself also remains positively related to persuasion but with reduced statistical significance, largely due to the addition of many correlated variables to the model, especially the measures of optimism. Still, even in this all-inclusive multivariate model, Deference to authority II almost reaches conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance (as does Deference to authority III when substituted).

The analysis in Table 4 also lends strong support to the hypothesis that legalism matters for institutional persuasion. Russians who think it is necessary to follow the law even if the law is burdensome –a difficult choice in a transition country with many burdensome laws—are more likely to be persuaded by a pro-rights institutional decision. Similarly, Russians who think that judges should follow legal procedures even if this prevents people from getting what they are owed are more likely to be persuaded by a pro-rights institutional decision.

The findings about institutional trust are mixed. *Trust in the Duma* and *Trust in Putin* do not play a significant role in the model, no matter which other variables are included or excluded. *Trust in the Supreme Court* appears to be significant but in a negative direction, which might

implausibly suggest that Russians are more persuaded by the Supreme Court when they distrust the Court than when they trust it. Since trust in the Supreme Court is not statistically significant for persuasion when included in the model alone or with *Trust in the judiciary* in general as a control, we strongly suspect that the effect in Table 4 is spurious and largely due to the high correlation between trust in the Supreme Court and trust in the judiciary (.56, $p < .01$, N = 8,903). Most likely, there is simply no effect one way or the other of trusting the Supreme Court on the probability of being persuaded to support rights. Trust in high courts and the legislature is also not statistically significant if we include interaction terms representing trust only by those who were asked about each particular institution in the question on persuasion to support rights.[10] Tested in many different ways, then, trust in the source cue does not seem to play the anticipated role in persuasion.

Conversely, trust in courts in general does influence persuasion to support rights, and the finding is robust. That trust in courts in general is significant while trust in high institutions is not may buttress the idea that people are concerned with the ramifications of granting rights to disliked groups. The minority of Russians who trust the small, local institutions that are closest to implementing laws are probably less concerned with the ramifications of granting rights and therefore more willing to support pro-rights decisions, no matter their trust in the institution that made the decision.

Additional evidence that institutional persuasion to support rights has little to do with trust in the institution itself is found in the lack of statistical significance of the source cue (*Constitutional Court as source cue* and *Duma as source cue*). Previous bivariate analysis suggests that the source cue may not matter: Russians can be persuaded equally to support rights or deny rights by the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Duma (Baird and Javeline 2007). This finding holds true in the multivariate analysis shown in Table 4, which includes

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[10] Results are not shown but available on request.

dummy variables for the Constitutional Court and the Duma, with the Supreme Court as the omitted institution for comparison. Neither dummy variable is statistically significant, suggesting that persuasion can originate with any authoritative institution.

Liberalism matters for persuasion to support rights but only when measured in a concrete way, asking about a specific issue like press freedom rather than an abstract choice of freedom over order. We suspect that the concrete measure more clearly distinguishes the truly liberal Russians and therefore more validly tests whether the holding of liberal attitudes on other issues could persuade intolerant Russians to support rights. The greater validity of the concrete measure is supported by the fact that 51 percent of urban Russians chose freedom over order in an abstract question, while only 25 percent of urban Russians gave the liberal response to a concrete question (disagreeing that the government should have the right to impose censorship to protect society from extremist political ideas; see table 3). As further corroborative evidence, we substituted in the model another concrete measure of liberalism, whether government should have the right to impose censorship to protect presidential power (*Liberalism III* for *Liberalism II*; see table 3). For this question, 35 percent of Russians gave the liberal response opposed to censorship, and the variable is also highly significant for persuasion to support rights.[11]

Not surprisingly, *Initial attitude weakness* is the single most powerful explanatory variable for persuasion to support rights. Also not surprisingly, *Being unopinionated* in a general sense is significant for persuasion. Intolerant but generally unopinionated individuals should be more easily separated from their initial attitudes, including the intolerant attitudes, and thus more easily persuaded by a pro-rights institutional decision.

As hypothesized, optimism seems to facilitate persuasion to support rights, when optimism is measured as both a personality characteristic or as sociotropic economic assessments. Russians who are optimistic by nature and also about the economy may not be as threatened by the

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[11] Results not shown but available from authors on request.

ramifications of granting rights to disliked minorities, while Russians who are pessimistic may not want to risk giving minorities any advantages in an already grim situation. Probably for similar reasons, *Hostility* is negatively and significantly related to persuasion to support rights. Intolerant and hostile Russians are unlikely candidates for attitude change.

Age, *Religiosity*, and *Income* are all negatively and significantly related to persuasion to support rights. Younger, less religious, and poorer Russians are probably less set in their ways, less sure of their opinions, and more open to new ideas.

Perceived exclusion from majority views, *Self-efficacy*, *Gender*, and *Education* do not appear significantly related to persuasion to support rights. Due to limitations of survey space, we were not able to ask respondents whether they travel in social circles of likeminded or diverse individuals, a measure of perceived exclusion from majority views that taps into social networks and potentially could be very important for persuasion to support rights (Mutz 2006). We therefore still retain some belief that perceived exclusion from majority views, measured with greater nuance than was possible here, could be important for persuasion to support rights. Similarly, we retain some belief that self-efficacy may matter for persuasion to support rights, since self-efficacy is highly correlated with other statistically significant variables in the model, including optimism about the Russian economy, income, and especially age (older Russians believe they cannot solve their problems). Self-efficacy may be the causal mechanism connecting these variables to persuasion to support rights, since income, age, and assessments of the Russian economy probably influence the perceived ability to control outcomes in daily life (with some reverse causation as well).

Effects of deference to authority on being persuaded to support rights

[Figure 1]

Using the parameters estimated by the ordered logit in Model II in Table 4, we can estimate the probability of persuading an intolerant Russian to support rights given varying levels of deference to authority (Figure 1). To generate predicted probabilities, all explanatory variables are held constant at their means, except for our two measures of deference to authority, which are

varied from 1 (low deference) to 5 (high deference). In the first graph, we vary only Deference to Authority I, holding Deference to Authority II constant at its mean; in the second graph, we vary only Deference to Authority II, holding Deference to Authority I constant at its mean; and in the third graph, we vary both deference measures simultaneously.

Comparing intolerant Russians who think that a political leader should follow citizens' wishes to intolerant Russians who think the political leader should follow his instincts, the probability of retaining initial intolerant attitudes drops from .61 to .53, whereas the probability of being persuaded in the direction of a pro-rights court decision increases from .36 to .45.[12] These probabilities include intolerant Russians who were persuaded only a little (by, for example, continuing to be unsupportive of minority rights, only less emphatically) and those who were persuaded a lot (by completely changing their minds and supporting rights). If we look only at the extreme cases of persuasion three or four steps in the direction of a pro-rights court decision, the probability of being persuaded increases from .05 for the least deferential Russians, as measured by Deference I, to .08 for the most, a probability that is still low but nearly double what it otherwise might have been. Comparing intolerant Russians who think they can make decisions about governing the country better than most political leaders to intolerant Russians who think they can make decisions worse than most political leaders, the probability of retaining initial intolerant attitudes drops from .63 to .57, and the probability of being at all persuaded in the direction of the pro-rights court decision increases from .34 to .40. The probability of being extremely persuaded to move three or four steps in the direction of a pro-rights court decision increases from .05 to .07. Comparing the absolute least deferential Russians (scoring lowest on both Deference I and Deference II) to the most deferential (scoring highest on both Deference I and Deference II), the probability of retaining initial intolerant attitudes drops from .65 to .51.

[12] The remaining very small percentage of intolerant Russians strengthened their initial attitudes and became even less supportive of rights upon hearing of a pro-rights institutional decision.

The probability of being at all persuaded increases from .32 to .47, and the probability of being extremely persuaded to move three or four steps in the direction of a pro-rights court decision increases from .05 to .09, again a low probability in absolute terms but one that would represent huge strides for tolerance development, given that deferential Russians are nearly twice as likely as nondeferential Russians to be persuaded in an extreme way to support rights.

Could the effect be spurious due to social desirability bias?

A logical challenge to these findings is that they are an artifact of our measurement techniques and driven by "social desirability bias." In trying to please or avoid offending the interviewer, respondents often give answers they believe are "right," which in this case could mean agreement with an institutional decision. Our dependent variable may thus be a measure not of persuasion, but of a personality characteristic like desiring to please. Even worse, that very same personality characteristic may also correlate with our key independent variable, deference to authority, since eager to please individuals might also be the most deferential. This spurious effect could erroneously lead us to believe that deferential Russians are more likely than nondeferential Russians to be persuaded to support rights, when in reality all we have shown is that people who desire to please will appear both deferential and persuadable on a survey.

Anticipating this concern, we included in our survey several measures of personality characteristics that might help illuminate whether a desire to please the interviewer is driving our results. Interviewers were instructed to record at the end of each interview the degree to which the respondent was interested, patient, hostile, nervous, sincere, and intelligent. While interviewers are obviously exposed to respondents for only short amounts of time and not qualified to conduct personality evaluations, their assessments do provide insights into a respondent's interview personality and behavior, which is most relevant as a possible confounding explanation for persuasion to support rights. In particular, we might expect that a respondent reported as very interested or patient is concerned with trying to please the interviewer and therefore more likely to "guess" that being persuaded to support rights is the "correct" answer. In contrast, we might expect that a respondent reported as very hostile shares

few of these concerns and may even intentionally give the guessed "incorrect" answer.

Analysis of the relationship between these personality characteristics and persuasion to support right suggests that our findings are not spurious. In bivariate correlations, none of the six personality characteristics are significantly related to persuasion to support rights. In the multivariate analysis in Table 4, *Lack of hostility* does prove statistically significant, suggesting that intolerant individuals who lack hostility can be more persuaded to support rights than intolerant and hostile individuals. More importantly, since lack of hostility is characteristic of someone trying to please (whereas hostility suggests little desire to please), by controlling for *Lack of hostility* in the multivariate analysis, we decrease the possibility that the effect of deference is due to social desirability bias. The estimated effect of deference to authority is independent of interviewer assessed hostility and therefore more likely to be independent of a respondent's desire to please, suggesting that the relationship between deference to authority and persuasion to support rights is meaningful and robust.

Implications

We began this investigation rather pessimistically. Prior evidence suggested that the Russian public is generally unsupportive of granting rights to disliked minorities. Furthermore, if support for minority rights depended on traditionally accepted correlates of tolerance or persuasion such as examples of elite cooperation and compromise or trust in political institutions, it might appear that the prospects for persuading Russians to support minority rights are bleak, since these correlates in Russia are in short supply.

The findings presented here in many ways reinforce the pessimism. Only a minority of initially intolerant urban Russians can be persuaded by a Supreme Court (or Constitutional Court or Duma) decision to support rights, and many of the variables that help explain these few persuadable Russians are not subject to easy manipulation. For example, optimism and (lack of) hostility are largely ingrained personality characteristics. Liberalism and support for legal procedures are attitudinal correlates of support for minority rights that may be as difficult to change as support for minority rights itself.

We suggest that a small ray of optimism may be found in the statistically significant relationship between deference to authority and persuasion to support rights. Given that many Russians are comfortable yielding to the will of authoritative institutions, our main finding builds on a characteristic that is already present, not one that requires manipulation. Authorities can be instrumental in carving a path to rights protections in Russia if their decisions are pro-rights and publicized to a deferential public. If institutions will lead, many Russians will follow.

"Follow" need not mean a full and sincere transformation of deeply held intolerant beliefs. Among intolerant but persuadable Russians, even if many are insincere about their responses – the easy challenge to survey-based research—the willingness to profess persuasion may bode well for rights protection. At the very least, such individuals are unlikely to punish an elected official for holding pro-rights policy positions and implementing such policies, freeing those in a position of power from electoral reprisal, should they choose to protect minority rights.

Therefore, although this is a paper about mass attitudes, the implications are for elite behavior. Public support for rights rests heavily on whether courts and other authoritative institutions make pro-rights decisions and then make those pro-rights decisions known. Optimism or pessimism about the future of minority rights in Russia should be based on optimism or pessimism about the institutions responsible for granting and protecting rights.

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Table 1. Degree of Persuasion from forbidding rights to allowing (%)*

	2003	2004	2005	Total
Strengthened initial position two steps	1.2	1.4	.3	1.0
Strengthened initial position one step	7.6	6.4	8.6	7.6
No change	65.4	67.9	68.8	67.4
Persuaded one step in direction of Court decision	15.3	16.3	15.8	15.8
Persuaded two steps in direction of Court decision	6.4	5.1	3.1	4.8
Persuaded three steps in direction of Court decision	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.8
Persuaded four steps in direction of Court decision	2.5	1.3	1.5	1.7
N	4196	4185	4379	12,759

*** Sampling and weighting described in footnote 5.**

Table 2.*

Deference to Authority I (%)

If citizens disagree with a political leader on a particular issue, should the political leader follow their wishes or follow his own instincts? Do you feel this way strongly or only somewhat?

	2004	2005
Should follow citizens' wishes – strongly	42	40.7
Should follow citizens' wishes – somewhat	33.3	33.2
Should follow his own instincts – somewhat	10.8	10.8
Should follow his own instincts – strongly	4.6	6.4
Don't know	9.1	8.3
Refused	.2	.5
N	4,218	4,427

Deference to Authority II (%)

Compared to most political leaders, how much better or worse could you personally make decisions about the governing of our country? much better than most of today's political leaders, somewhat better, equal with them, somewhat worse, much worse

	2003	2004	2005
Much worse	29.2	25	22.6
Somewhat worse	16.8	18.4	20.8
Equally	15.9	18.2	21.7
Somewhat better	6.4	5.4	7.2
Much better	3.2	3.1	3.9
Don't know	25.2	27.5	19.6
Refused	3.4	2.4	4.2
N	4,228	4,218	4,428

Deference to Authority III (%)

Compared to most political leaders, how much better or worse do you believe the average/ordinary person (prostoi chelovek) could make decisions about the governing of our country? much better than most of today's political leaders, somewhat better, equal with them, somewhat worse, much worse

	2003	2004	2005
Much worse	21.5	17	18.2
Somewhat worse	18.6	20.4	22.3
Equally	22.6	22.6	25.2
Somewhat better	6.4	6	6.1
Much better	2.5	3.9	3.6
Don't know	26.8	29.3	22.2
Refused	1.4	.8	2.4
N	4,227	4,219	4,427

* Samples sizes reflect only those respondents who initially preferred to deny rights to Jehovah's Witnesses or were unsure. Results for the entire sample, including those who initially supported rights, are very similar and are available from the authors on request. Sampling and weighting described in footnote 5.

Table 3. Measures of Additional Hypothesized Correlates of Persuasion to Support Rights*

Variable	Survey Questions
Legalism I – Support for following law even if burdensome	Some people think that it is necessary to observe every law without exception. Others think that there are reasons for not following the law. To what extent do you think it is acceptable for people not to follow the law when the law becomes too burdensome? always acceptable, acceptable in many cases, don't know, acceptable only in extreme cases, never acceptable (five point scale)
Legalism II – Support for procedural justice over distributive justice	Some people think that, when making decisions, judges should follow ONLY legal guidelines. Others think that judges sometimes should take other factors and circumstances, besides laws, into account. If we are talking about what you personally would want to see in the ideal, to what extent do you think judges should follow ONLY legal guidelines even if this prevents people from getting what they are owed? always, in the majority of cases, don't know, from time to time, almost never (five point scale)
Trust in government (judicial system in general/courts, Supreme Court, Duma, Putin)	Using this card, please tell me how much trust you have in each of the following organizations and government bodies/public figures – a great deal of trust, a fair amount of trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all? (four point scale for each)
Perceived exclusion from majority views	How much do think your opinions on the basic questions of contemporary Russian politics coincide with the opinions of the majority of Russians? fully coincide, on the whole coincide, coincide only a little, don't coincide at all (four point scale)
Liberalism I – preference for freedom over order	Certain people think that it is better to live in a society with strict order, even if it requires limiting freedom of speech. Others think that people should be free to say whatever they want, even if what they say increases tensions in society. Which view is closer to your own? Do you feel this way strongly or only somewhat? ["don't know" accepted but not offered] (five point scale)
Liberalism II – opposition to censorship of extremist ideas	Should the government have the right to impose censorship of the news media to protect society from extremist political ideas? Yes, no Do you feel this way strongly or only somewhat? ["don't know" accepted but not offered] (five point scale)
Liberalism III – opposition to censorship in name of presidential power	Should the government have the right to impose censorship of the news media to protect presidential power? Yes, no Do you feel this way strongly or only somewhat? ["don't know" accepted but not offered] (five point scale)
Initial attitude weakness	Some people think Jehovah's Witnesses are a religious cult that present a danger to Russian society and should be forbidden from distributing literature on the street. Other people think that, regardless of whether they present a danger to Russian society, Jehovah's Witnesses should have the right to distribute literature on the street. Which view is closer to your own? Do you feel this way strongly or only somewhat? (three point scale: strongly forbid, somewhat forbid, uncertain)
Being unopinionated	Count variable of the "don't know" responses to 115 questions (virtually every attitudinal variable in the data set), including attitudes toward the economy, courts, rule of law, judicial independence, corruption, procedural fairness, interest in politics, trust in political institutions, respect for various professions, and

	perceived efficacy of political activities (low 0, high 94, mean 12)
Optimism I – general personality characteristic	Some people usually expect the best even when times are uncertain. Others feel that when things can go wrong, they will go wrong. Which view is closer to your own? Do you feel this way strongly or only somewhat? [“don’t know” accepted but not offered] (five point scale)
Optimism II – economic assessments	Over the next twelve months, do you think the economic situation in Russia will improve a lot, improve a little, remain the same, worsen a little, or worsen a lot? (five point scale)
Self-efficacy	[Prefaced by: What is the single most serious problem facing you today?] Can you yourself do anything to help solve this problem, or is the problem completely out of your control? can do something, completely out of my control [“don’t know” accepted but not offered] (three point scale)
Lack of hostility	[Interviewer assessment] During the interview, was the respondent very, somewhat, not very, or not at all hostile? (four point scale)
Institutional source cue (Constitutional Court, Duma)	Institution said to grant or deny rights to Jehovah’s Witnesses (dummy for each, with Supreme Court being the omitted institution)
Age	What is your age? (years)
Religiosity	How important is religion in your life – very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important? (four point scale)
Income	Taking account of the income of all members of your household last month, please select the category on this card which corresponds approximately to the total income of your family. less than 2000 rubles, 2001-3000 rubles, 3001-4000 rubles, 4001-6000 rubles, 6001-8000 rubles, 8001-10000 rubles, 10001-15000 rubles, more than 15000 rubles (eight point scale)
Gender	Dichotomy
Education	What is your educational level? 7 grades or less, incomplete secondary, complete secondary (including secondary PTU, specialized secondary (technikum), incomplete higher (at least three years), higher (complete), advanced degree (seven point scale)

* A response of “don’t know” was coded in the middle of the scale only when justified theoretically because an uncertain response seemed to fall between the scale’s extremes (Legalism I, Legalism II, Liberalism I, Liberalism II, Liberlism III, Optimism I, Self-efficacy). For survey questions where a middle alternative was offered and yet respondents still replied “don’t know,” such responses were kept distinct (Optimism II). For questions that required some knowledge or information, “don’t know” responses were also kept distinct, given the possibility that the respondents’ informed opinions would not fall in the middle of the scale (Trust in government, Perceived exclusion from majority views).

Table 4: Effects of Deference to Authority on Persuasion to Support Rights
Ordered Logit Estimates

	Model I	Model II
Deference I – *Leader should follow instincts over citizens' wishes*	.09 (.04)	.10 (.04)
Deference II – *I am worse at making decisions than political leaders*	.11 (.04)	.06 (.04)
Initial attitude weakness	.93 (.06)	.99 (.06)
Legalism I		.12 (.03)
Legalism II		.10 (.03)
Trust in judicial system		.13 (.06)
Trust in Supreme Court		-.10 (.06)
Trust in Duma		.02 (.05)
Trust in Putin		.01 (.05)
Perceived exclusion from majority views		.01 (.07)
Liberalism I		.03 (.02)
Liberalism II		.11 (.03)
Being unopinionated		.01 (.005)
Optimism I		.09 (.04)
Optimism II		.10 (.06)
Self-efficacy		.14 (.09)
Lack of hostility		.19 (.08)
Constitutional Court as source cue		.03 (.13)
Duma as source cue		-.12 (.08)
Age		-.01 (.002)
Religiosity		-.06 (.04)
Income		-.04 (.02)
Gender		-.04 (.08)
Education		-.01

		(.02)
N	12,759	12,759
Cutpoints	τ_1	-2.30
	τ_2	0.09
	τ_3	4.14
	τ_4	5.46
	τ_5	6.40
	τ_6	7.13

Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is seven ordinal categories (-2 = strengthened initial anti-rights position two steps, -1 = strengthened one step, 0 = no change, 1 = persuaded one step in the direction of the pro-rights decision, 2 = persuaded two steps, 3 = persuaded three steps, 4 = persuaded four steps). Deference I is a five category variable (1 = should follow citizens' wishes strongly, 2 = should follow citizen's wishes somewhat, 3 = don't know, 4 = should follow his instincts somewhat, 5 = should follow his instincts strongly). Deference II is also a five category variable (1 = much better, 2 = somewhat better, 3 = equally, 4 = somewhat worse, 5 = much worse). Measurement of the remaining variables is described in Table 3. Results are not shown for several other included variables, dummies for "don't know" and missing responses for all the substantive variables except those for which there were no missing data (Strength of initial opinion, Lack of hostility, Duma as source cue, Constitutional Court as source cue, Age, Gender, and Education). Rather than toss out these missing respondents, reduce our sample size, and risk biasing our results, we coded nonrespondents as -1 and included dummy variable controls for whether the respondent gave a substantive response. Results of the dummy nonresponse variables are available from the authors on request. Taylor linearization was used for variance estimation. In two instances, only one primary sampling unit and very few observations existed for a given stratum, so these primary sampling units were collapsed into the most adjacent strata. (See Brogan 2005 for an explanation of this procedure.)

Figure 1. Effects of Deference to Authority on Being Persuaded to Support Rights: Predicted Probabilities



Deference to Authority I
Responses to "If citizens disagree with a political leader on a particular issue, should the political leader follow their wishes or follow his own instincts?"



Deference to Authority II
Responses to "Compared to most political leaders, how much better or worse could you personally make decisions about the governing of our country?"



Combined responses to Deference I and Deference II