Brendan Snow
Regional Integration and Democratic Governance
The Democratic
Deficit Argument: 5 Strands
1. The EU has strong executive institutions and weak(er) legislative ones. Because of this, EU actors are not accountable to their national democratic institutions.
2. The European Parliament is too weak.
3. There are no truly “European” elections, meaning that there are no elections where the European parties must nominate candidates which then compete for European votes based on policy issues.
4. The EU is too distant from voters, who care not about European politics.
5. Because of the nature of European (economic) integration, EU policies do not reflect the majority of European people’s preferences, and there is a bias in the EU towards the (center-)right.
Majone: Credibility
Crisis Not Democratic Deficit
The EU acts to regulate policy by correcting market failures and in doing so produces Pareto-efficient outcomes (whereby at least some gain and none loose). This is good! If fully democratic, the majoritarian systems of governance would undermine this efficiency, and undo the steps taken by the EU to promote the general welfare. The problem, then, is not lack of democracy but lack of legitimacy in the minds of Europeans. The solution? More transparency. “What the EU needs is more transparent decision making, ex post review by courts and ombudsmen, greater professionalism and technical expertise, rules that protect the rights of minority interests, and better scrutiny by private actors, the media, and parliamentarians at both the EU and national levels” (7).
Moravcsik’s
Objections to the 5 Strands of The Democratic Deficit Argument
1. The EU has strong executive institutions and weak(er) legislative ones. Because of this, EU actors are not accountable to their national democratic institutions.
Moravcsik’s Objection: National
governments most directly accountable for politics and politicians in
Question: But are the national governments not delegating powers to
their appointees to create supranational institutions? Haven’t they done
precisely this? Do the delegates not
have a certain amount of vested authority and autonomy from their national
governments? In short, don’t
supranational institutions still exist despite national governments’ best
intentions?
2. The European Parliament is too weak.
Moravcsik’s Objection: The EP has increased its power in the last two decades with respect to the legislative process and the selection of the Commission. Case in point: the veto power of the EP, as seen in the October 2004 veto of the Barroso Commission.
3. There are no truly “European” elections, meaning that there are no elections where the European parties must nominate candidates who then compete for European votes based on policy issues.
Moravcsik’s Objection: Little to none, however EP elections not salient enough to be really significant to the average European. Also, universal democracy is inefficient and too costly to the average voter.
4. The EU is too distant from voters, who care not about European politics.
Moravcsik’s Objection: EU policy making now transparent than most domestic forms of government. “The growing paranoia inside the EU institutions about their isolations from citizens, and the new internal rules in response to public and media accusations, have made it much easier for interest groups, the media, national politicians, and even private citizens to access documents or information about EU policy making – easier indeed than access to information from national policy processes” (9). This is also a tacit answer to Majone’s legitimacy crisis.
Question: Doesn’t Moravcsik contradict himself in his objection to
point 3 above and point 4? EU politics
may be more transparent, but so what?
The average voter isn’t concerned with EP elections, as Moravcsik stated
above.
5. Because of the nature of European (economic) integration, EU policies do not reflect the majority of European people’s preferences, and there is a bias in the EU towards the (center-)right.
Moravcsik’s Objection: Extensive checks and balances within the EU ensure that all parties are pulled towards the middle. There is a high threshold for the adoption of any EU policies, and so they (EU policies) tend to be very centrist, “the result of a delicate compromise between all interest parties, from all member states and all the main party positions” (9).
Authors’ Points of
Agreement and Disagreement
Majone:
1. Agreement: Pareto-efficient policies must be isolated from majoritarian government. In other words, to ensure fair play, the regulating body must be beyond biased politics.
2. Disagreement: Difficult to find the institutions that fill this role in the EU. “Many EU regulatory policies have identifiable winners and losers…” (12). Majone also offers no reason why some policy areas need to be controlled by a non-majoritarian body.
Moravcsik:
1. Agreement: Checks and balances within the EU institutional framework necessarily create centrist policies.
2. Disagreement: The EU’s clear bias towards market freedom and trade liberalization (right of center) undermines the welfare state (left of center). (Perhaps. For a qualifier on this objection please see pg. 13, end of the top paragraph.)
The Benevolent
Dictatorship vs. Democracy Problem
Should supranational institutions work for the betterment of all but under a democratic deficit, or should democracy be implemented that would risk inefficient and zero-sum policy making between member states?
Problem: Benevolent dictators and enlightened elites lack legitimacy. Policies enacted by supranational elites, even though seen to be for the benefit of all, may not reflect the preferences of a majority of citizens.
Follesdal and Hix:
Constrained Democracy is better than Pareto (Beneficient) Authoritarianism
Main features of democracy: (1) Institutionally established procedures that regulate (2) competition for control over political authority, (3) on the basis of deliberation, (4) where nearly all adult citizens are permitted to participate in (5) an electoral mechanism where their expressed preferences over alternative candidates determine the outcome, in such ways that the government is responsive to the majority or to as many as possible.
What creates preferences in voters?
1. Endogenous preferences: already existing, more or less permanent preferences in voting demographics.
2. Exogenous preferences: preferences that are generated by the institutions and political actors competing for the voter’s expressed approval.
Problem: Most voters are not concerned with EU level politics.
Problem: There are no Europe-wide institutional procedures for the competition and election of EU actors by the ordinary citizen.
Observation: “Competitive elections are crucial to make policies and elected officials responsive to the preferences of citizens” (16).
Solution:
“Rather than assuming a European ‘demos’ is a prerequisite for genuine
EU democracy, a European democratic identity might well form through the
practice of democratic competition and institutionalized cooperation”
(17). Create European democratic
institutions that would facilitate the emergence of a European democratic
identity. This would solve the
democratic deficit problem and ensure that European politics are focused around
the good for
Question: Who will institute this Europe-wide democracy? By what process will it be implemented?
The punch line, as I see it: Only the enlightened elite are willing and able to produce European wide elections. In this way, they would solve the democratic deficit problem through the creation of Europe wide elections, complete with competition for votes, and also force the voter to think about what is best for Europe, not just his or her country, thus solve the problem of state-centered action through the creation of a new European, instead of a simply national, identity in the average European voter.