

PSCI 7142 (Fall 2006)

Seminar in Institutional Theory

Class Meetings: Wednesdays, 1300-1530, Ketchum 116
<http://sobek.colorado.edu/~jupille/200603/PSCI7142/>

Professor: Joe Jupille
Office: Ketchum 103
Hours: M 1200-1400, T 1000-1100 & by app't

jupille@colorado.edu
TEL (303) 492-5445
FAX (303) 492-0978

v1.0—subject to change

Description

Institutional theory (i.e., the “new institutionalism”) has burgeoned across the social sciences in the last two decades. This course provides a survey of the main variants and key applications of institutional theory as they have developed and been used across the Comparative, International and American subfields of Political Science. The first nine weeks will focus on the underpinnings, promise and pitfalls of institutional theory and survey foundational works from the historical, rational choice and sociological institutional schools. We will then proceed to consider applications of these approaches in a variety of Comparative, International and American settings, with topical focus on economic development, legislatures, and international institutions. The concluding meeting will address itself to the “endogeneity problem” of institutional analysis and assess implications of the “institutional turn” for the discipline.

Requirements

Papers. You will undertake a substantial original research project for the class. I will provide detailed guidelines by week two. You will be required to submit a paper topic, outline, draft and final copy per the course schedule below. **I will not accept late submissions at any stage.**

Participation & Presentations. Course material will not be conveyed through lectures. I will briefly give 5-10 minute introductions. After the introduction, each student will give a 2-3 minute reaction to the reading, placing on the agenda any questions for discussion. After each student has given his or her reaction, every week one (or more) student(s) will give a 10-minute presentation synthesizing that week’s readings and providing a detailed critique. To avoid facile critiques, an additional student will have the responsibility of defending that week’s readings, answering the attacks lodged by that week’s presenter(s). We will then proceed to a general discussion.

Nota Bene. Students must come to class having done the reading and must be prepared to engage in discussion. Unexcused absences will reduce the final grade by 5% for each occurrence. Failure to participate or failure properly to prepare will also generate sizeable deductions.

Grade Computation

| | |
|----------------|-----|
| Participation: | 30% |
| Presentations: | 10% |
| Paper Topic: | 05% |
| Paper Outline: | 05% |
| Paper Draft: | 10% |
| Final Paper: | 40% |

Course Materials

The schedule below lists required (and sometimes recommended) readings for each meeting's topic. The books listed below are required for the course, and have been made available for purchase through the CU Bookstore. Other readings are available online, either through E-Reserves or through E-Journals (identified as E-ARTICLE), and hence all available through the library web page.

1. **Duina**, Francesco. 2006. *The Social Construction of Free Trade: The European Union, NAFTA and Mercosur*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691123535
2. **Greif**, Avner. 2006. *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade*. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521671345
3. **Gruber**, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691010412
4. **Knight**, Jack. 1992. *Institutions and Social Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521421896
5. **Pierson**, Paul. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691117152
6. **Powell**, Walter W., and Paul J. **DiMaggio**, eds. 1991. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0226677095
7. **Skowronek**, Stephen. 1982. *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920*. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521288657
8. **Smith**, Steven S., and Thomas F. **Remington**. 2001. *The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691057370

Policies

Special Accommodations

I will be happy, when possible, to accommodate students' needs. Please note, however, that requests for special accommodations need to be presented in a timely manner: at least one week prior scheduled exams / assignments.

Learning disabilities

If you qualify for accommodations because of a disability, please submit to me a letter from Disability Services in a timely manner so that your needs may be addressed. Disability Services determines accommodations based on documented disabilities. Contact: 303-492-8671, Willard 322, and <http://www.Colorado.EDU/disabilityservices>

Religious Observance

Campus policy regarding religious observances requires that faculty make every effort to reasonably and fairly deal with all students who, because of religious obligations, have conflicts with scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance. The above remark on timely signaling of special accommodation needs applies also to religious observance needs. See full details at http://www.colorado.edu/policies/fac_relig.html

Class Behavior

Students and faculty each have responsibility for maintaining an appropriate learning environment. Students who fail to adhere to such behavioral standards may be subject to discipline. Faculty members have the professional responsibility to treat all students with understanding, dignity and respect, to guide classroom discussion and to set reasonable limits on the manner in which they and their students express opinions. Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important with respect to individuals and topics dealing with differences of race, culture, religion, politics, sexual orientation, gender variance, and nationalities. Class rosters are provided to the instructor with the student's legal name. I will gladly honor your request to address you by an alternate name or gender pronoun. Please advise me of this preference early in the semester so that I may make appropriate changes to my records. See policies at <http://www.colorado.edu/policies/classbehavior.html> and at http://www.colorado.edu/studentaffairs/judicialaffairs/code.html#student_code

Academic Integrity

All students of the University of Colorado at Boulder are responsible for knowing and adhering to the academic integrity policy of this institution. Violations of this policy may include: cheating, plagiarism, aid of academic dishonesty, fabrication, lying, bribery, and threatening behavior. All incidents of academic misconduct shall be reported to the Honor Code Council (honor@colorado.edu; 303-725-2273). Students who are found to be in violation of the academic integrity policy will be subject to both academic sanctions from the faculty member and non-academic sanctions (including but not limited to university probation, suspension, or expulsion). Other information on the Honor Code can be found at <http://www.colorado.edu/policies/honor.html> and at <http://www.colorado.edu/academics/honorcode/>

Discrimination & Harassment

The University of Colorado at Boulder policy on Discrimination and Harassment (<http://www.colorado.edu/policies/discrimination.html>), the University of Colorado policy on Sexual Harassment and the University of Colorado policy on Amorous Relationships apply to all students, staff and faculty. Any student, staff or faculty member who believes s/he has been the subject of discrimination or harassment based upon race, color, national origin, sex, age, disability, religion, sexual orientation, or veteran status should contact the Office of Discrimination and Harassment (ODH) at 303-492-2127 or the Office of Judicial Affairs at 303-492-5550. Information about the ODH and the campus resources available to assist individuals regarding discrimination or harassment can be obtained at <http://www.colorado.edu/odh>.

Course Schedule

Subject to change.

| MTG | DATE | TOPIC | READINGS |
|------------------------|----------|---|---|
| I. Introduction | | | |
| 1 | 20060830 | Introduction to Institutional Theory | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. <i>Political Studies</i> 44 (December): 936-957 (E-ARTICLE); Weingast, Barry R. 2002. Rational-Choice Institutionalism. In <i>Political Science: The State of the Discipline</i>, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, 660-692. New York: W.W. Norton (E-RESERVE); Pierson, Paul, and Theda Skocpol. 2002. Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science. In <i>Political Science: The State of the Discipline</i>, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, 693-721. New York: W.W. Norton (E-RESERVE); March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1996. Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions. <i>Governance</i> 9, 3 (July): 247-264 (E-RESERVE). |
| II. Approaches | | | |
| 2 | 20060906 | Power and Authority: General | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Knigh, <i>Institutions and Social Conflict</i>; Mandel, Ernest. 1971. <i>The Marxist Theory of the State</i>. New York: Pathfinder Press, pp. 8-20 (E-RESERVE); Moe, Terry M. 2005. Power and Political Institutions. <i>Perspectives on Politics</i> 3, 2 (June): 215-233 (E-ARTICLE). |
| 3 | 20060913 | Power and Authority: Application PAPER TOPIC DUE IN CLASS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gruber, <i>Ruling the World</i>. <p><u>RECOMMENDED</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MacIntyre, Andrew. 2003. <i>The Power of Institutions: Political Architecture and Governance</i>. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Howell, William G. 2003. <i>Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action</i>. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. |
| 4 | 20060920 | Choice and Efficiency: General | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coase, Ronald. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. <i>Economica</i> 4 (November): 386-405 (E-ARTICLE); Coase, Ronald. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. <i>Journal of Law and Economics</i> 3 (1): 1-44 (E-RESERVE); <p><u>RECOMMENDED</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Schotter, Andrew. 1981. <i>The Economic Theory of Social Institutions</i>. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 5 | 20060927 | Choice and Efficiency: Applications | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. |

| | | | |
|--------------------|----------|---------------------------------------|---|
| | | PAPER OUTLINE DUE IN CLASS | <p>The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. <i>Economics and Politics</i> 2, 1 (March): 1-23 (E-RESERVE);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> 102, 4 (August): 745-777 (E-ARTICLE); • Weingast, Barry R. 1995. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development." <i>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</i> 11, 1 (April): 1-31 (E-ARTICLE). |
| 6 | 20061004 | Norms and Identity: General | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Powell & Dimaggio, <i>The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis</i>, chs. 1-10; • March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 78, 3 (September): 734-749 (E-ARTICLE); <p><u>RECOMMENDED</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. <i>Rediscovering Institutions</i>. New York: Basic Books. |
| 7 | 20061011 | Norms and Identity: Applications | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982. Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood. <i>World Politics</i> 35, 1 (October): 1-24 (E-ARTICLE); • Jackson, Robert H. 1987. Quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory: International jurisprudence and the Third World. <i>International Organization</i> 41, 4 (Autumn): 519-549 (E-ARTICLE); • Strang, David. 1991. Anomaly and commonplace in European political expansion: realist and institutional accounts. <i>International Organization</i> 45, 2 (Spring): 143-162 (E-ARTICLE); • Meyer, John W., et al. 1997. World Society and the Nation-State. <i>American Journal of Sociology</i> 103, 1 (July): 144-181 (E-ARTICLE). |
| 8 | 20061018 | Time and Sequencing: General | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pierson, <i>Politics in Time</i>. <p><u>RECOMMENDED</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i> 2: 369-404; • Page, Scott E. 2006. Path Dependence. <i>Quarterly Journal of Political Science</i> 1: 87-115. |
| 9 | 20061025 | Time and Sequencing: Application | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skowronek, <i>Building a New American State</i> |
| III. Topics | | | |
| 10 | 20061101 | Institutions and Economic Development | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greif, <i>Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy</i>, chs. 1-9, 12. |

| | | | |
|----------|-----------------|---|---|
| | | | <u>RECOMMENDED</u> |
| 11 | 20061108 | Legislatures | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Everything written by Douglass North. • Matthews, Donald R. 1960. <i>U.S. Senators & Their World</i>. New York: Vintage Press, pp. 92-117 (E-RESERVE); • Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 23, 1 (February): 27-59 (E-ARTICLE); • Weingast, Barry R., and William J. Marshall. 1988. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> 96 (1): 132-163. • Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly</i> 19, 2 (May): 149-179 (E-ARTICLE); • Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto. 2005. Endogenous Institutional Change in the Mexican Senate. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i> 38, 10 (December): 1196-1218. <p><u>RECOMMENDED</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gamm, Gerald, and John Huber. 2002. Legislatures as Political Institutions: Beyond the Contemporary Congress. In <i>Political Science: State of the Discipline</i>, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, 313-341. New York: W.W. Norton. |
| 12 | 20061115 | Legislatures PAPER DRAFT DUE IN CLASS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smith & Remington, <i>The Politics of Institutional Choice</i> |
| X | 20061122 | | Holiday |
| 13 | 20061129 | International Institutions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Keohane, Robert O. 1982. The Demand for International Regimes. <i>International Organization</i> 36, 2 (Spring): 325-355 (E-ARTICLE); • Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. <i>International Security</i> 19, 3 (Winter): 5-49 (E-ARTICLE); • Snidal, Duncan. 1996. Political Economy and International Institutions. <i>International Review of Law and Economics</i> 16 (March): 121-137 (E-ARTICLE); • Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. <i>International Studies Quarterly</i> 45: 487-515 (E-ARTICLE). <p><u>RECOMMENDED</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-author symposium entitled "Promises, Promises: Can Institutions Deliver?" <i>International Security</i> 20, 1 (Summer 1995): 39-93, especially the articles by Keohane & Martin, Ruggie, Wendt, and the reply by Mearsheimer. |

| | | | |
|------------------------|----------|---|--|
| 14 | 20061206 | International Institutions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Duina, <i>The Social Construction of Free Trade</i> |
| IV. Conclusions | | | |
| 15 | 20061213 | The Endogeneity Problem in Institutional Analysis | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field, Alexander James. 1979. On the Explanation of Rules Using Rational Choice Models. <i>Journal of Economic Issues</i> 13, 1 (March): 49-72 (E-ARTICLE); • Riker, William H. 1980. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 74, 2 (June): 432-446 (E-ARTICLE); • Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1986. Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions. In <i>Political Science: The Science of Politics</i>, edited by Herbert F. Weisberg, 51-81. New York: Agathon Press (E-RESERVE) • Grafstein, Robert. 1988. The Problem of Institutional Constraint. <i>Journal of Politics</i> 50, 3 (August):577-599 (E-ARTICLE); • Shvetsova, Olga. 2003. Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects. <i>Constitutional Political Economy</i> 14: 191-212 (E-ARTICLE); • Przeworski, Adam. 2004. Institutions Matter? <i>Government and Opposition</i> 39, 4 (September): 527-540 (E-ARTICLE). |
| X | 20061218 | FINAL PAPERS DUE IN THE POLITICAL SCIENCE OFFICE BY 5 P.M. | |