

BOOK REVIEWS

Joseph Jupille, *Procedural Politics: Issue, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 294 pp. Cloth, \$80.00.

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In *Procedural Politics: Issue, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union*, Joseph Jupille argues that political scientists have given inadequate attention to the politics within the European Union (EU) over rules. Many scholars study the politics surrounding its treaty making—the historic grand bargaining—and the everyday politics that occur within its rules. But the politics that surround the construction of midlevel rules is undertheorized. Jupille's book convincingly fills this gap. As I am writing this review, the U.S. Senate is in an intensely partisan debate over federal judicial nominations. Senate Democrats used the filibuster procedure to thwart several of President Bush's nominees in 2004. Republicans appear to be moving ever closer to "the nuclear option," whereby the Senate rules would be rewritten to prohibit judicial filibusters. Democrats see such a step as an unseemly exercise of raw political power. Republicans conceive it as a principled and necessary move that comes with being in the majority. Jupille would see this as politics over rules, whereby the rules themselves become the point of contestation.

Drawing on institutional theories used to explain the U.S. Congress, Jupille offers a positive theory of procedural politics in the EU using game-theoretic, strategic, and rational-actor approaches and then tests his theory with aggregate data and case studies from two policy areas. This theory for procedural politics addresses the following questions: When and why are institutional actors likely to engage in procedural politics? What effect do procedural politics have on policy outcomes? Jupille argues that political actors must find both opportunities and incentives for engaging in procedural politics, and if these conditions are met, they will do so to maximize their institution's influence. At first blush, a rational-actor, influence-maximization thesis may seem underwhelming, if not obvious, but there is much more to Jupille's book.

His theory for procedural politics, discussed in chapter 2, distills into five hypotheses. First, procedural politics occur when an issue raises jurisdictional ambiguity; that is, an issue could fall under more than one jurisdiction. Second, as alternative rules appear to confer more influence on political actors, procedural politics become more common. His next two hypotheses address the processes and behavior of procedural politics. Hypothesis 3 says that actors will define policy issues strategically to "fit" rule procedures that confer greater influence. This may include trying to fuse disparate legislative proposals, to fissure multidimensional proposals, or to reframe a pro-

posal to secure a more favorable rule. The effects of procedural politics are addressed in the fourth and fifth hypotheses. Legislation subject to procedural politics will take longer to adopt than legislation not subject to procedural politics. Finally, it is hypothesized that procedural politics feed back into higher order institutional change by identifying gaps in the existing treaty regimes.

Readers unfamiliar with the nitty-gritty of EU policy making are well advised to start with chapter 3. In 20 or so pages, Jupille describes the core institutions, their respective powers, and the procedural rules that frame the policy making. One is immediately impressed with just what a political labyrinth the Europeans have concocted. This consequentially is an unavoidably dense, acronym-laden chapter. Its density affirms just how much nitty-gritty there is to study, and Jupille is unflinchingly (and necessarily) thorough in his coverage. Sympathizing perhaps with some readers, he places the formal modeling that underpins this chapter in an appendix and provides instead a welcome and easily digestible narrative summation of it.

This chapter also conceptualizes the EU as a procedural system. Each treaty article granting the EU policy-making powers promulgates the rule or legislative procedure that must be followed to effectuate that article. Nine different rules exist, with various voting thresholds for each institution and each rule calling for slightly different interinstitutional interaction. Jupille models from these nine rules what the procedural preferences would be for the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of Ministers. Animating the spatial models is the assumption that legislative actors prefer procedural rules that maximize their power.

Having outlined his theory and applied it to the EU, Jupille in the next three chapters presents empirical data that test his five hypotheses. Chapter 4 provides an aggregate picture of procedural politics from 1987 to 1997. Mining archives at the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament, and the European Commission, Jupille shows that the number of legal disputes, an indicator of procedural politics, varied longitudinally and by issue area. By studying instances in which one institution responds to a rule proposal coming from another institution, he finds support for his influence maximization hypothesis. Jupille then tests his model in a multivariate setting and finds statistically significant estimates occurring for both jurisdictional ambiguity and institutional incentives. The final third of the chapter demonstrates that procedural politics exert predictable and important effects on how politics is done and the chances for higher order rule reform. Regression analyses provide strong indications that legislation subject to procedural politics takes more than twice as long to pass as legislation not subject to similar politics. The regression results are not as strong for longer term institutional change, but Jupille concludes that EU institutional change “would be seen to respond not only to contemporary member state preferences, bargaining power, and contracting needs, but also to the weight of past institutions. Procedural politics informs and incites institutional change” (p. 121).

In chapters 5 and 6, Jupille narrows his empirical focus to explore the procedural politics in two EU policy sectors: environmental and agricultural policy. These are welcome chapters that provide concreteness to what “politics over rules” looks like. The first of these case study chapters analyzes the procedural politics that attended

three waste management policies enacted in the 1980s (the Titanium Dioxide Directive, the Waste Framework Directive, and the Waste Shipment Regulation), and the second considers agricultural policies from the 1980s and 1990s concerning beef hormones and beef labeling. These are wonderfully intricate chapters that closely trace the institutional interactions of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council. They get the reader into the thick of politics over rules and roundly confirm, with a few caveats, Jupille's theory of procedural politics. The case studies demonstrate how institutional actors brought different rule preferences to policy debates, how they acted strategically to advance those rule preferences, and how the procedural politics affected larger order reforms to the EU's constitutional regime.

If I would lodge a complaint, and a very small one at that, it would be that the book can be unforgiving. It is fast out of the gate discussing theoretical and conceptual matters associated with procedural politics in the EU, making it difficult in the early going to appreciate just what procedural politics looks like on the ground. I was pining for an introductory vignette that would illustrate the procedural politics dynamic and for more examples of the conceptual terms in the early chapters. My suggestion is for the uninitiated to begin with the empirical chapters (chapters 4 to 6) and circle back to his theoretical framing. Beyond the obvious audience of EU scholars, this book will appeal to those studying comparative legislative systems, the U.S. Congress, and transnational politics. It is inappropriate for all but the most accomplished undergraduate students, but would work well in graduate seminars, not only for what it says about procedural politics in the EU but also for its splendid display of how good social science frames questions and marshals evidence.

Steven I. Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 306 pp. Cloth, \$75.00.
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Why do some states try to prevent mass violence against ethnic minorities, whereas other states ignore or even actively encourage such violence? Scholars have suggested that factors such as socioeconomic conditions, variation in state capacity to prevent mass violence, informal institutions, and the success (or failure) of consociational power-sharing arrangements may help answer this question. However, in his persuasive account of variation in violence against the Muslim minority in India at the town and state levels, Steve Wilkinson suggests that existing theories fail to explain accurately why there exists substantial variation in how states respond to mass violence against ethnic minorities. Wilkinson emphasizes in particular that his "electoral-incentives model" provides a parsimonious and more accurate account for the observed variation in the responses of state and local governments to violence against ethnic minorities.