

CHAPTER 4:

THE FPÖ AND BZÖ AGAINST MIGRANTS IN AUSTRIAN CITIES

01. Introduction

The death of Jörg Haider in Austria, in October 2008, marked yet another chapter in the saga of populist right-wing parties in Europe. Haider and his party(ies) had become a symbol of a new twist in European politics.

Supporters admired his tough stance on immigration, in defense of Austrian values and cultural integrity, and also his anti-establishment positions. Detractors called him a fascist, an anti-Semite and intolerant populist politician who capitalized on peoples' fears. Whichever way we look at it, it is undeniable that Haider represented an icon of a Europe that was not satisfied with the status quo in immigration, or with change coming the way it looks now.

The on-and-off success of right-wing populist parties (see Jackman & Volpert 1996; Lubbers et al. 2002; Bale 2003 amongst others) is now a recurring theme in many European countries. Since their main battle cry is immigration policy, or, more simply stated, the rejection of the current flows of immigration, their success is also a signal that voters in many Western European countries oppose the changes in the composition of their communities. As noted before in scholarly research, this is not a new trend. Migratory flows in the US have always provoked feelings of rejection, which translated in nativist political movements

(Fetzer 2000). The phenomenon is relatively new in Western Europe because of the novelty of inbound migratory flows. Also, the enlargement of the European Union to the East in 2004 and 2007 has opened the doors to legal intra-EU migration that caught older members by surprise. Some of the countries (especially the UK) that chose not to implement the 2+3+2 option experienced a flood of migrants from enlargement members. That sudden flow did not fly well, especially in the lowest layers of the population, where locals found themselves in competition with newcomers for low-skilled jobs (BBC, November 20, 2007).

Austria, for its own part, is not new to immigration inflows (see Figure 1 and 2) and ethnicity-related political struggle. In Haider's home *Lander*, Carinthia, his party opposed policies to introduce bilingualism to accommodate the local Slovenian minority. His policies and declaration were geared toward the limelight and sometimes he backtracked from its most controversial comments. However, his stance on immigration and cultural integrity was a constant of his leadership in the FPÖ and of his newest creature, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) (Fallend 2006).

[Chart #1 AND #2 ABOUT HERE]

This research aims at showing that immigration heavily influenced the success of Haider's BZÖ party in the 2008 Austrian general elections and that migrants from more evident non-Austrian origins played a larger role in prompting its success than other groups of migrants.

The next part of this chapter will present a literature review of the scholarship on migration and extreme right-wing parties in Europe, with a special focus on the Austrian case. The third part will provide more detailed background on the Austrian case. The fourth part will introduce my research design, with my hypotheses, and the fifth part will showcase my data analysis with my findings. Finally, the last part will draw some conclusions from my research.

02. Literature Review

Reaction to migratory flows is a story of interest, identity and perception. I will argue that perception is the most important component of this political behavior. Interest comes into play when we consider labor relations. Austrian legislators have partially addressed this issue by resorting to immigration quotas: in 1991 the social partners in Austria agreed to limit the percentage of alien workers to 10% of the total Austrian workforce, a threshold then lowered to 9% in 1993.

I will not go into details about the general affects of immigration on domestic unemployment. We need only remind that immigrants do not generally displace domestic workers on a one-to-one basis, which would typically happen under three conditions (Borjas 1991): limited jobs in the domestic economy (i.e. no economic growth with new entrances in the market);

migrants and natives are perfect substitutes and wages for foreigners are lower than those for natives. The opposite type of situation would be a segmented labor market where natives refuse to take jobs that migrants then get (Piore 1979).

As Winter-Ebmer & Zweimuller (1999) point out, at least in 1988-1991, a period of significant immigration in Austria, immigration had a modest impact on unemployment risk for natives, with the exception of seasonal workers and immigrants themselves. This and other research, in and out of Austria (Lahav 2004) point out that the direct impact of migration on natives' unemployment risk is oftentimes modest. The previous chapter of this research also concluded that in Italy the political reaction about migration did not come from unemployment.

My premise here is that it is sufficient that domestic workers have the perception of a menace to their employment to provoke such reaction. The Northern League in Italy has been effective at exploiting such perception, and my hypothesis here is that the BZO has done the same, regardless of the entity of the menace itself (or its presence at all). Knigge (1998) also highlights that *'unemployment and immigration significantly affect support for extreme right-wing parties independently rather than conjunctively'*. As Lubbers et al. (2002) found out, the presence itself of non-Western residents is one of the main causes of cross-national differences in support of extreme right-wing parties in the Europe.

Jackman & Volpert (1996) maintained that high levels of unemployment provide a propitious context for the rise of extreme right-wing parties, but that by itself is just an intervening variable, not even a necessary condition. These studies consider levels of unemployment in the aggregate, at the national level. However, unemployment variation across municipalities can be enormous in a single country. Analyzing data at the municipal level reveals that, for instance, the Northern League in Italy has had remarkable success in municipalities with almost full-employment.

Extreme right-wing parties often contend that immigrants take away jobs from natives (Betz 1994, 1998; Knigge 1998, Kriesi et al. 2006) but they also appeal to the conservation of identities and communities (Zasllove 2004). Kriesi et al. (2006) remarked that the connection between economic changes and the re-discovery of identity in Europe depends on the result of the antagonism between winners and losers from the process of globalization. They maintain that this antagonism results in a conflict between integration and demarcation. Van der Brug et al. (2005) highlight that the above is the main thesis of the proponents of the 'socio-structural' model of voting for radical right parties (Betz 1994, 1998; Knigge 1998; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000).

The proponents of policy and ideological voting models (Van der Brug et al. 2000, Eatwell 1998, Ivarsflaten 2005, 2008) maintain that policy considerations are one of the main factors in shaping citizens' preferences for anti-immigrant parties. This is one of the underlying themes of this research. Assuming that right-wing populist parties are effective at using migrants as

targets for public resentment, citizens will see policies that try to limit the presence and inflow of migrants as a positive development. The above parties are usually very explicit in the formulation of those policies in their campaigns (see Van der Brug et al. 2000).

The opportunity structure (Kitschelt 2005, 2007) of a country's party system is important for determining a right-populist party's success (and of course, other kinds of non-mainstream parties), but that is an enabling factor, rather than a determining one. The structure of the political system can impede the rise of right-wing populist parties, and therefore the political expression of domestic resentment against migrants. However, the issue itself does not cease to exist simply because it cannot find an institutionalized political outlet. In this research, I assume, that the issue will manifest itself through whichever channel of discontent citizens find. If the institutional structure allows for such parties to rise, then citizens will manifest their discontent through voting. If it doesn't, or at least it makes it much more difficult, like in the UK, for example, then citizens will find other venues through which they can manifest their discontent.

The goal of this research is not so much to find out why citizens react to migration, but how (voting for anti-migrants parties or expressing discontent with their local administration), how much, and what groups of migrants are more likely to provoke this kind of reaction. In this sense, this research is situated in the policy voting stream (see Van der Brug et al. 2000, Ivarsflaten 2008): citizens vote for the parties that propose a desired solution to the migration issue. There are several reasons for that kind of vote, which many scholars and I (see

also Zaslave 2004) deem not mutually exclusive. Here I am interested in the vote itself and the signal (migrants) that prompt that process. Also, I am interested in the local variations of the phenomenon. This research does not have the tools to point out every local factor that might cause variations of the phenomenon. It can, however, highlight where those variations occur and their magnitude. In this sense, we can think of this research as an exploratory venture to raise both empirical and methodological issues

The next part will provide some background on the Austrian case, specifically on the origins of Haider's party and its political fortunes in relation to migration issues.

03. Background

The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) was not Jörg Haider's creature, but he made it his, as many charismatic political leaders before him. The party was born in 1955 in opposition to both the Christian-Democrat style Austrian People Party and the socialist Social Democratic Party of Austria. The party was a container of anything else, from pan-German views to liberal (in the European sense of the world) positions.

Haider's rise in the ranks of the FPÖ was quick. He was leader of the youth movement of the FPÖ in 1970 and in 1979, at 29, the youngest delegate to Parliament. Only seven years after that he assumed the leadership of the party, which at the time hovered around 5-6% of the electorate.

Under his leadership the FPÖ veered decisively toward the brand of nativism/nationalism it has been known for in the European media. After his breakthrough election as governor of Carinthia in 1989, Haider started appearing on the European media with controversial statements on nationalism, immigration policy, and the European Union (BBC, February 29, 2000). Haider's firm and charismatic guide led the FPÖ to the right, and the Austrian public rewarded the new leadership: the party increased its national share of the electorate from 5% in the 1986 elections to close to 27% in the 1999 elections. In the meantime, Haider, got re-elected as governor in Carinthia in 1999 where the FPÖ achieved a plurality of 42% of the votes.

The party received even more coverage in Europe when, after the 2000 elections, it formed a government coalition with the People's Party: in protest for the inclusion of the controversial FPÖ, the governments of the other (at the time) fourteen members of the EU ceased cooperation with the Austrian government. Fallend (2001) reports that *"Up to this time, the FPÖ under its charismatic party chairman Jörg Haider had been considered as unacceptable for government participation because of his vehement attacks against the 'old parties' and other 'pillars' of the democratic republic, in particular social partnership, because of his radical ideas aiming to establish an authoritarian presidential republic, and because of his ambiguous stance towards National Socialism."*

That EU boycott did not last long, and business as usual resumed in the summer of 2000; also, Haider stepped down as leader of his party at the end of the year, while continuing to pull its strings from the backstage. The government

did not last either, and the successive elections brought a decline in the electoral performance of the FPÖ, especially outside of Carinthia (Fallend 2003), with a loss of 18.6% compared to the 1999 elections.

Also, Haider started to gain some opponents inside his own party. In 2005 he and some other leaders of the FPÖ decided to create a new party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ - Bündnis Zukunft Österreich). The new party achieved 4.1% of the votes in the general elections of 2006 and 10.7% in the general elections of 2008, with the FPÖ polling 11% and 17.5% respectively.

This research follows the path of policy and ideology voting models, but anti-migrant parties have a harder time rising to prominence if the domestic political opportunity structure is stacked against minor parties, as it happens, for instance, in the UK. Here we can take the political opportunity structure for granted, since the Austrian PR electoral system and its federal structure is more favorable to non center-bound parties. The following part will therefore concentrate on politics and policies of our two anti-migration parties.

03.1 Politics & Policy Positions

Since its creation in 1956, the FPÖ was the party of voters that were opposed to the domination of the socialist-clerical block in Austrian political life. At the beginning, it was a container of German nationalists and liberals (in the European sense of the term), which made it an atypical liberal party, even

though it was admitted into Liberal International, the worldwide group of liberal parties, in 1979 (Solsten & McClave 1994).

Its founder, Anton Reinthaller, was part of the post-Anschluss government of Seyss-Inquart, and his party reflected this condition of atypical container for freedom-oriented and nationalism-oriented voters alike (Ibid). Until the rise of the nationalist wing, the party fought hard for free enterprise and individualism, opposing the increase of the role of the state in the economy. As reported above, until the late 1980s, the FPÖ hovered around 6-7% of the votes in Austrian general election, with only one brief experience in power between 1983 and 1986.

Jorg Haider came from the nationalist wing of the FPÖ, and did not make a mystery of his orientations. This research will not focus on his most controversial positions or statements, namely his consideration for Nazi employment policies and his downplaying of deportation of Jews in Germany (BBC May 29, 2002). Instead, we will focus on FPÖ's (and subsequently BZÖ's), positions on immigration. Both the FPÖ and BZÖ have expressed a bundle of policy positions that cater to the themes of nationalism and cultural integrity. Anti-immigration sentiments were one of the constants of such policy positions. I will show that both parties focused heavily on immigration issues and provided voters who were not satisfied with the immigration-driven demographic change in Austrian with a possible answer.

Some of the political positions of the FPÖ shifted back-and-forth under Haider's populist leadership. The party first supported Turkish's accession to EU

then resisted it, just like Austria's own membership: after endorsing it, the FPÖ led the 'no' referendum campaign against the entrance in the EU in 1994. The party position on migration though was quite consistent throughout the 1990s and 2000s, both in terms of politics and in terms of policy. In sum, the FPÖ (and the BZÖ) have a consistent record to woo voters that oppose what they perceive as the excessive presence of migrants in their own country (for a more complete review of the origins of such policies, see Wischenbart 1994).

The first major effect of Haider's political efforts against migration came in 1991, when the Parliament passed a law that set a quota of no more than 10% of the workforce for foreign workers. This threshold was lowered to 9% in 1993 with the Resident Alien law, again sponsored by FPÖ's efforts. On his local political turf, Haider led the effort in Carinthia to fight bilingualism in schools, refusing at first to obey An Austrian Constitutional Court ruling that asked for bilingual signs in Carinthian localities that have more than 10% Slovene-speaking inhabitants.

Immigration remained a focus throughout the 1990s with the FPÖ in opposition, and it remained so when the party entered the Austrian government in 2000. The government lowered immigration quotas again in 2002. In October 2002, the ÖVP and FPÖ published a draft of a so-called 'integration treaty' that would have required immigrants and jobless foreigners in Austria to take German language classes (Fallend 2002). Haider went even further and proposed that all foreign residents should have had their fingerprints taken and that asylum seekers should have waited for the procedure in their home country.

All other Austrian parties refused to support this proposal, including the FPÖ's coalition partner, ÖVP.

The FPÖ could not deliver on the campaign promises during its government period, and it blamed the government for that (even though it was formally part of it. In the meantime, however, the ÖVP, as it happened to other moderate right-wing parties in Europe, started hijacking some of the agenda of its less moderate partner (Fallend 2003 & 2005). That tactic has prompted some scholars to wonder whether right-wing populist parties are actually viable once they make the transition from opposition to government (Fallend 2004). The FPÖ positions did not soften as an effect of that: its government in province of Carinthia came under fire for canceling the agreement with the national government concerning the distribution of asylum seekers (Fallend 2005). Also, the FPÖ expressed opposition to any negotiations at all with Turkey for its pending accession to the EU (ibid.).

The split of the party, with Haider founding the BZÖ, did not really change the policy positions of the FPÖ, which now had to cope with a right-wing competition. In practice, the political agenda of the two parties overlapped to a large extent, in both the campaign of 2006 and of 2008. Fallend (2006) reports that the *'new' FPÖ copied the traditional campaign issues of the 'old' FPÖ (during its opposition years under chairman Haider): immigration, criminality and security. Also, that the BZÖ's major campaign issues (immigration, law and order, families) resembled those of the 'old' and 'new' FPÖ* (Fallend 2007). Later on, in

2007-2008, FPÖ and BZÖ demanded legislation prohibiting the construction of muslim religious buildings and the wearing of the hijab (headscarf) in Austria.

In sum, a review of declarations and legislation shows that both the FPÖ and BZÖ presented consistent political statements and policy positions to voters who wanted a strong stance against immigration, and an equally strong posture in favor of assimilation into the Austrian culture for legal foreign residents. The ÖVP tried to reduce the political space to its right by taking on some of those issues, and that seemed to work for a brief period. Once they solved leadership issues, though, both far-right populist parties were back in favor with Austrian voters: as reported above, after a poor performance in 2006, they polled a total of 27.5%, more than the FPÖ had ever achieved by itself (26.9% in 1999).

Fallend (2007), reporting on the 2006 elections, highlighted that *“FPÖ voters were mainly attracted by the party’s restrictive immigration policy (60 per cent) and its position against Turkish EU accession (24 per cent). Likewise, its anti-foreigner stance was the key motive for most BZÖ voters, though to a lesser degree than for the FPÖ voters (33 per cent).”* Even in a poor performance as in the 2006 elections then, there was roughly 15% of the Austrian electorate that rewarded parties that relied primarily on anti-foreigner or anti-European attitudes (Fallend 2007). The 2008 elections, if anything, reinforced that estimate.

The next part of this research will illustrate my research design, describe my data and introduce my model.

04. Research Design

My review of the policy positions of the BZÖ and the FPÖ has shown that these parties can indeed match the preferences of voters that consider the presence of migrants in Austria as excessive. Given findings of previous literature and my own analysis, here follows my hypotheses:

H1.a: higher inflow of foreigners in a municipality will determine an increase the performance of both the BZÖ and the FPÖ, everything else equal.

H1.b: if citizens perceive a significant difference between the two parties in terms of platform, policy, or ideology, the anti-migrant vote will concentrate on the party further away from the mainstream parties, namely, the BZÖ.

H1.c: non-EU foreigners will have a stronger positive impact on the increase in performances of anti-migrant parties, everything else equal.

H2: everything else equal, worse economic conditions in a municipality, here in the form of higher unemployment, will have a positive effect on anti-migrant vote.

H3: lower religiosity will have a negative effect on anti-migrant vote, everything else equal.

Before I proceed to describe the details of my model, a note on welfare effects. Conflict theories of attitudes toward migrants state that migrants compete for scarce resources such as jobs but also public services. From this, I should hypothesize that higher levels of citizens on the welfare rolls in a given

municipality should increase the performance of anti-migrant parties. However, both the FPÖ and the BZÖ have always campaigned vigorously against government's wastes, handout, and so forth. My expectations about the effect of welfare dependency therefore will stay neutral, since there are theoretical and empirical reasons for both negative and positive effects on anti-migrant voting.

My model focuses on the results of the 2008 Austrian Nationalrat (National Assembly) elections in comparison with the previous elections of 2006. I focus on Haider's BZÖ party and on his previous party, the FPÖ. My main dependent variables are, thus, the difference in electoral performances of the two parties between the 2006 and 2008 elections at the municipality level. I have built three models to try to capture the different inputs to the two parties. In theory, I could have considered the two parties as political 'twins', given that they have, as I showed, negligible differences in terms of platforms, policies and legislation. In reality though, the political space that they occupy is not the same in the eyes of the electorate. When voters compare parties, one of the most common ways is to consider them in a left-right continuum. In this case, voters put the BZÖ to the right of the FPÖ.

The three models have three distinct dependent variables: a) percentage difference in performance of the BZÖ between 2006 and 2008 at the municipality level; b) percentage difference in performance of the FPÖ between 2006 and 2008 at the municipality level; and c) percentage difference in

cumulative performance of the two parties between 2006 and 2008, still at the municipality level ¹.

My independent variables come from the Austrian national census and official statistics, at the municipality (Gemeinde) level ². A word of caution is necessary here. The last Austrian national census dates back to 2001, therefore not all the data I was able to collect are as recent as it ought to be in my analysis. That notwithstanding, I have decided to proceed in my research with the data at my disposal. The present quantitative analysis is to be considered experimental and tentative. When new official data become available, I will be able to build a more reliable data set. Here follows the description of my main independent variables and of my controls, all at the municipal level. For a full discussion of independent variables in the analysis of anti-migrant voting, please refer to the first chapter.

Main Independent Variables

Non-EU foreign-born change, 2001-2008: this variable measures the percentage change in the population of non-EU foreign-born residents in municipalities. I have chosen the foreign-born measure rather than the foreign citizens because this captures those citizens that look 'different', in the sense of non-native, which citizens might take as a signal of demographic change in their

¹ Official electoral data comes from the Austrian Federal Ministry for the Interior: <http://wahl08.bmi.gv.at/>.

² The source of the data is the Statistik Austria web site data base 'Ein Blick auf die Gemeinde' ('A look at the municipality'): <http://www.statistik.at/blickgem/>.

municipality. The expectation for this variable is that the higher the change, the higher the increase of votes for anti-foreigners parties.

EU foreign-born change, 2001-2008: this variable measures the percentage change in the population of EU (EU 15 minus Austria) foreign-born residents in municipality. The reason for choosing the foreign-born measure is the same as above. The expectation for this variable is neutral. Given the limited ethnic, cultural and religious difference, the increase in the presence of EU-14 foreigners should not give a boost to anti-foreigners party.

Controls

Population change 2006-2007, internal migration: I use this variable to measure how dynamic, and therefore attractive (for Austrian citizens) a municipality is. More dynamic municipalities should be less conducive to voting for anti-migrant parties: a more dynamic population should make the recognition of newcomers harder, and therefore have a dampening effect on the electoral performances of anti-foreigner parties. Also, there might be an interesting dynamic at play here. Highly dynamic cities might have a high supply of what Putnam (2007) calls 'bridging' social capital, whereas less dynamic ones might be high on 'bonding' social capital but low on its bridging side.

Local taxes average change, 2006-2007: this variable measures the average change in local taxes in 2006 and 2007, therefore just before the 2008 elections. This variable will help us see the effect of public spending on voting.

The mechanism behind this variable could unfold in one of the following fashion: a) more expenses mean more services for all, then it should have a neutral impact on the likelihood of voting for an anti-migrant party; or b) more expenses derive from demographic pressure from immigration, and therefore it would make voters more likely to vote for either the BZÖ or the FPÖ.

Unemployment ratio, 2001: this variable tries to assess economic sociotropic factors (see literature review, chapter 1). Citizens that see the economic situation in his community deteriorate, might ascribe this fact to demographic change and might sympathize with the difficulties of his community even though he is not personally worse off. The expectation for this variable is that the higher the unemployment, the higher the likelihood to vote for an anti-migrant party.

Welfare recipients ratio, 2001: this variable also tries to assess sociotropic concerns in terms of economic threat. The part of the population that receives welfare benefit should feel either the direct menace of the economic competition (in terms of access to welfare services) of immigrants or the sociotropic concern for their community. A higher ratio of welfare recipients in a municipality should make it more likely to vote for anti-migrant parties.

Population aged 65 and over, 2008: previous research and Eurobarometer surveys have shown that advanced age makes citizens more likely to dislike immigration. My expectation for this variable is positive: the higher the percentage of older citizens, the more likely a municipality would be to lean toward anti-migrant parties.

Religion, Islamic, 2001: the percentage of residents that identify themselves as Islamic is aimed at measuring values-related concerns. My expectations are that the higher the percentage of Islamic immigrants, the higher the likelihood that a municipality would vote for a party that tries to protect its religious integrity.

Religion, no declared religion, 2001: this variable is also aimed at measuring concerns about values. Here I expect that the higher the percentage of citizens not declaring any religious affiliation, the lower the potential concerns about immigrants of a different religion, and therefore the lower the likelihood that the municipality lean toward anti-migrant parties.

University education attainment, 2001: previous research has shown that university-level education attainment makes voters less likely to vote for anti-migrant parties. The expectation for this variable is therefore negative: higher levels of education attainment would make a municipality less likely to lean toward anti-migrant parties.

Turnout increase, 2006-2008: I use this variable to account for the 'protest vote' effect (see Betz 1994, amongst others): more turnout should signify a higher mobilization of the electorate, which should favor populist parties such as the BZO and FPO in Austria.

I have collected data for all Austrian municipalities above 8,000 inhabitants as of January 1, 2008, which gives me a sample of 104 municipalities. I categorized my sample by the 8 states or Länder of the Austrian Federal

administration (plus of course Vienna, which constitutes a municipality *and* a state): 1 municipality from Burgenland, 10 municipalities from Carinthia (Kärnten), 32 from Lower Austria (Niederösterreich), 19 from Upper Austria (Oberösterreich), 8 from Salzburg, 12 from Styria (Steiermark), 11 from Tyrol (Tirol), 11 from Vorarlberg, and Vienna (Wien). The next part will show the results of my empirical analysis.

05. Analysis & Findings

In my analysis, I utilized different specifications of my three models. I started with a standard OLS regression with a dummy variable for the state of Carinthia, because of the dominant position of the FPÖ during the years of Haider's governorship and the stronger electoral base and militancy that the FPÖ and the BZÖ enjoy in the state. To see whether there were some regional patterns outside of Carinthia, I have also used a fixed effect model. Given the dimension of the intra-state sample though, I decided to focus on the OLS model³.

³ The fixed effect model exhibited different results than the OLS model, indicating that there could be statistically relevant geographic patterns at play. Unfortunately, my sample was not large or balanced enough: it averaged 13 observations per state, but had states like Niederösterreich with 32 on one extreme and Burgenland with 1 at the other. The next step of this research will be to expand the sample of Austrian municipalities to reach at least 50 units per state. For more information, take a look at the fixed effects model in table #2 in the Appendix.

The first observation from my analysis is that there is a clear winner for the anti-foreigner vote in the 2008 Austrian general elections, and that is the BZÖ. Even though the FPÖ shares pretty much the same platform (and it could not have been otherwise, given Haider's influence), the same political agenda and the same legislative initiatives with the BZÖ, the latter was able to conquer an important political space. In all the specifications of my model, the BZÖ seems to capture the anti-foreigner vote. The models that had the FPÖ change alone as dependent variable were not statistically significant as a whole, whereas the models that used their joint change were barely so. The first assessment of my hypotheses then is that we can reject (H1a) and that we cannot reject (H1b).

There is a Downsian argument to be made here. It looks like, even though the two parties overlap, they cannot possibly occupy the same space in the political spectrum or they would not guarantee the same focus on specific issues (namely, immigration issues) to the Austrian electorate. The electorate therefore decided that the BZÖ would match its policy preferences more closely. What I found here then confirms Lahav (2004): the electorate is actually able to distinguish even fine tuned policy differences, and to deliver votes to the party that most closely matches those preferences. Also, this finding lends support to opportunity-structure models (Kitschelt 2005, 2007), even though we have no case to compare it to here.

There is another side of this story, though, that social science cannot properly measure yet. This electoral shift could very well be about leadership. Haider died on October 11, 2008, whereas the Nationalrat election was held on

September 28 of the same year, so there was no emotional influence of his untimely death on the results. The European elections of June 2009 could be a preliminary test of the importance of Haider's leadership for his party. The BZÖ did not follow the wave of success of right-wing parties in this round of elections: it yielded only 4.6% of the votes and gained no representatives to the EU Parliament. On the other hand, this was the first European election for the recently founded BZÖ, and the turnout was quite low (45.97% - still higher than the previous round by 3%). Still, Haider rode the anti-EU sentiment in his country and both the FPÖ and the BZÖ were adamantly anti-EU. In this round, Haider's former party gained 12.71% of the votes, up 6.5% from the previous EU Parliament elections. We will have to wait to assess the effect of leadership more accurately, but from a look at the Austrian case it seems that the importance of leaders cannot be overstated⁴, especially for such populist parties (for a discussion of the impact of leadership, see van der Brug & Mughan 2007).

[OLS TABLE #1 ABOUT HERE]

The findings from my BZÖ model show results that are only partially in line with my expectations (see Table #1). As expected, higher internal migration

⁴ The leadership issue also relates very well to the local dimension of politics. Even though the mass media has expanded the reach of politicians of all ranks, the capacity of the leader to root his/her party at the local level is fundamental to build a stable consensus. The case of Haider and his success in Carinthia is a fitting example. On one hand, he was able to take advantage of his notoriety in the state and in the country as a whole; on the other hand, he and the 'mutinies' from the FPÖ were able to take advantage of pre-existing structures to root his new political initiative at the local level. Future elections will tell if after the death of a charismatic leader, the cadres of the BZÖ were able to complete the connection with the social tissue of Austrian communities.

makes a municipality less likely to vote for the party (the variable exhibits a t-score of -1.92). The change in non-EU citizens from 2001 had a positive sign, indicating lower propensity to vote for the party, but the variable was not quite significant (t-score of 1.56). On the other hand, the variable that measures the change in EU citizens was positive *and* significant (t-score of 1.90, a 95% statistical significance level in a one-tail test), indicating a higher propensity of voting for the BZÖ for those municipalities that hosts more EU citizens. This finding rejects hypothesis (H1.c) and lends itself to multiple readings. A possible explanation is that EU citizens are already attracted to more diverse cities where the population is already less inclined to vote for the BZÖ. Another explanation is that citizens in municipality that are inclined to vote for the BZÖ identify foreigners as 'aliens' no matter what their origins. I remind the reader that this variable measures EU-15 foreign-born Austrian residents with the exclusion of Germans, who speak the same language of Austrians⁵. Another explanation, impossible to explore here without dynamic data, is that anti-migrant vote has expanded even to those municipalities that did not show that effect before: the viable pool of municipalities for FPÖ and BZÖ voting might be expanding, to include also those that have a more sustained inflow of EU foreigners. To show the effect of the increase in EU-14 foreigners on the change of votes for the BZÖ, I have plotted the predicted value for my models, varying the independent

⁵ Interestingly, if I leave German citizens inside the EU-15 group, then the variable becomes statistically insignificant, which validates my decision to exclude them.

variable and keeping the remaining variables at their mean value. Results can be observed in the figure below.

[PREDICTED VALUES, FIGURE #1 ABOUT HERE]

My model does not find cultural effects: neither the variable that measures residents identified as Islamic nor the one that measures self-declared non-religious residents are statistically relevant, even though they are both negative, as from my expectations. We can therefore reject hypothesis (H3). One possible explanation for that might be that municipalities had already absorbed the cultural change, since those data come from the census of 2001. More recent data from the next census should allow me to see whether that is the case or not. In the meantime, I can only report that overall religious-related concerns do not seem to be determinant in the vote for the BZÖ. Probably a different kind of measurement would be able to capture the effect of religion-related concerns with more precision. Until then, I will have to suspend my judgment. My other cultural-demographic control, which measures the percentage of citizens with university diplomas, exhibited the expected negative sign and was statistically significant at the 95% level (t-score of -2.07).

The group of economic variables presented mixed results. Local taxes increase was clearly statistically insignificant, even though it presented the expected positive sign. The same applied to the unemployment level, which leads me to reject hypothesis (H2). As for the other variables, the availability of more recent unemployment data at the municipal level might spell some light on the importance of this specific sociotropic economic concern in Austria. So far,

there is hardly a case for a job competition-based argument at the local level. The measure of the level of welfare recipients, on the other hand, had a negative sign and was statistically significant (with a t-score -2.72) at the 99% level. That does not square with a welfare-competition argument (such as the Northern League's in Italy, for instance), but it does square with the BZÖ's rhetoric against government corruption and elephantiasis, rhetoric that the party has maintained from its FPÖ origins (see Fallend 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007) . On a speculative level, we could also think that municipalities that have a smaller welfare payroll also have more active persons in the workforce, and therefore host more privately owned small businesses, which previous research has found to be conducive to negative attitudes toward migrants.

This kind of finding is an example of how problematic it is to assess the measure the sources of such anti-migrant parties. Both the BZÖ and Northern League (and the FPÖ, clearly), for instance, have campaigned against public spending, and at the same time have highlighted how public spending should help citizens rather than immigrants. That is a perfectly coherent message to which the electorate in both countries has been apparently receptive. The problem for social science is to find reliable data to measure such effect. Also, we should be able to 'unbundle' social services' measurements in order to see what they deliver to immigrants at the local level and how much it costs.

My last demographic control, the percentage of elder residents, had, as expected, positive sign and it was also statistically significant at the 95% level (with a t-score of 2.05). This confirms previous findings about the composition of

extreme right-wing parties' electorate. Finally, the local dummy for Carinthia was of course positive and statistically significant (at the 99.9% level, with a t-score of 10.37), whereas the turnout variable had a positive sign as well and it was statistically relevant only at the 95% level (t-score of 1.78), somewhat confirming that higher mobilization favors more radical parties, as from protest vote models (Betz 1994). The last part of this research will draw conclusions and implications from my analysis.

06. Conclusions

In sum, my analysis showed a series of both expected and unexpected results. One is that even in a small country like Austria local context varies considerably, which makes it important in our attempt to measure the reasons of anti-migrant vote. This should be an encouragement for social scientists to unbundle national politics and dig into local context.

Using the municipality as a level of analysis, however, can introduce disturbances in our models, given the multiple channels of transmission of voting attitudes. We have seen in my analysis that across-city effects have an influence on the reliability of estimates. Given the data at my disposal and especially the size of my sample, I cannot be fully confident that my results constitute the definitive word on anti-migrants voting. It would be presumptuous to think otherwise, not only because of the reliability of data, but also because immigration is not the only issue voters care about, so its fluctuations in the

media cycle and the relative importance of other concerns determine how much immigration influences voters' choices. Researchers using time-series models should therefore take this methodological issue into consideration.

My research at the local level does not assess a clear prominence of either economic or religious concerns. In the pooled model, economic concerns seem to play a bigger part than religious ones. However, a preliminary fixed effect model, which I am not reporting in the main body given the insufficient dimension of cross-state sample, shows that the role of culture becomes important if we take regional considerations into account (see fixed effect model in appendix). This leads me to think that multi-level modeling might be capable to gauge the complexity of local and regional variations in this kind of analysis. While waiting for more exhaustive data at all levels of analysis, we should remember that the back-and-forth in the social sciences literature about the relevance of alternative set of independent variables, measuring economic, cultural and other concerns also reflects the circumstances of the period. We should be aware that our findings are time- and location-specific, because the relevance of those issues is contextualized as well.

That notwithstanding, we should still try to analyze how communities' politics react demographic change. There is a problem with trying to extract some implications from this kind of analysis though. Immigration policy is decided at the national level. What's more, recent EuroBarometer polls (Standard EB. 70, 2008) indicate that a majority of EU citizens think that the EU should be the institution to deal with the issue. It all makes sense if we considered the EU as

a relatively homogeneous set of geographic administrative divisions. That is not the case. My research has highlighted profound differences on the attitudes toward immigration across municipalities, differences that are bound to provoke different 'welcomes' to migrants. Removing decision-making about immigration farther away from communities is not likely to make the issue easier to deal with. On the other hand, a EU-level immigration policy would let immigrants sort themselves in a way that reflects their preferences. It is to be demonstrated, though, that it would match the preferences of locals.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: OLS Regression
Dependent Variable: BZO Change 2006-2008, %

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf.]	Interval]
Pop. Change '06-'07: Internal Migration	-0.069	0.036	-1.92	0.058	-0.140	0.002
Foreign-born Change: Non-EU '01-'08	0.189	0.12	1.56	0.122	-0.052	0.429
Foreign-Born Change: EU13 '01-'08	1.42	0.744	1.90	0.060	-0.061	2.89
Local Taxes Increase '06-'07	0.022	0.041	0.54	0.590	-0.060	0.104
Religion: Islamic	-0.019	0.072	-0.26	0.797	-0.162	0.12
Religion: Non affiliated	-0.035	0.049	-0.70	0.485	-0.133	0.063
Unemployment	0.146	0.38	0.38	0.703	-0.614	0.907
Welfare Recipients	-0.510	0.19	-2.72	0.008	-0.882	-0.138
University Education	-0.159	0.077	-2.07	0.041	-0.312	-0.006
Aged 65 plus	0.418	0.204	2.05	0.043	0.013	0.823
Turnout change '06-'08	0.056	0.031	1.78	0.079	-0.007	0.118
Carinthia dummy	7.43	0.716	10.37	0.000	6.01	8.85
Constant	11.7	1.91	6.13	0.000	7.89	15.5

N = 104; Prob > F = 0.00; R-Squared = 0.7221; Adjusted R-Squared = 0.6885

Table 2: Fixed Effects Regression, by Lander (State)

Dependent Variable: BZO Change 2006-2008, %

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Pop. Change '06-'07: Internal Migration	-0.008	0.021	-0.37	0.713	-0.051	0.035
Foreign-born Change: Non-EU '01-'08	-0.015	0.076	-0.19	0.847	-0.166	0.137
Foreign-Born Change: EU13 '01-'08	0.785	0.573	1.37	0.174	-0.355	1.92
Local Taxes Increase '06-'07	0.031	0.024	1.29	0.199	-0.017	0.08
Religion: Islamic	-0.131	0.053	-2.47	0.016	-0.236	-0.025
Religion: Non affiliated	-0.068	0.032	-2.13	0.036	-0.131	-0.005
Unemployment	0.359	0.24	1.50	0.138	-0.118	0.836
Welfare Recipients	-0.194	0.118	-1.65	0.104	-0.428	0.040
University Education	-0.050	0.049	-1.02	0.311	-0.146	0.047
Aged 65 plus	0.073	0.123	0.59	0.554	-0.171	0.317
Turnout change '06-'08	0.022	0.018	1.21	0.228	-0.014	0.059
Constant	11	1.25	8.66	0.000	8.35	13.3

N = 104; Number of Groups = 8; Observation per group min = 1, avg. = 13, max = 32
 R-Squared: within = 0.2979, between = 0.3684, within = 0.2869; corr(u-i, Xb) = 0.3621

F test that all $u_i=0$: $F(7, 85) = 75.05$

Figure #1: Predicted values of BZO Change (%) in presence of EU14 foreigners, German citizens excluded.

