

CHAPTER 5:

CONCLUSIONS

01. Findings

The principal aim of my research is to explain the political reaction against migrants in European cities. I have focused on the cities of three countries: the UK, Italy and Austria. It is now time to sum up my findings, assess the contributions and the limitations of my research, proposing venues to make it better, consider its practical implications, and speculate on the future of migrants in municipalities in Europe.

First of all, my approach to the three cases is very similar even though not exactly symmetrical. In Britain I have used the BVPI survey, whereas in Italy and in Austria I have used voting for anti-migrant parties in order to gauge citizens' attitudes toward migrants. Neither instrument is perfect. Neither asks citizens directly what their gripes are with the presence of migrants or which groups of migrants they have issues with. This notwithstanding, I claim that both the BVPI survey¹ and anti-migrant parties voting are effective instruments because they allow me to gauge, albeit imperfectly, the direction and the shape of the political reaction to migration at the local level.

¹ I regressed BVPI survey scores with the presence of BNP councilors in 2006-2008 on a limited sample of 53 UK municipalities (only in municipalities where the BNP ran for

The BVPI survey, even more than anti-migrant party voting, allows us to directly connect citizens' political discontent with their municipality with the presence of migrants. Its standardized format and its ample samples make it a reliable instrument for comparing citizens' satisfaction across municipalities. The survey asks citizens directly about their municipality, so there should be a more direct connection with how they judge the community they live in.

Anti-migrant party voting, at first glance, might seem to be an even more direct instrument to gauge citizens' attitudes, but they present some inconveniences. One comes from my research design. For the sake of uniformity, I have chosen national election results from both Italy and Austria. The reason for this choice is that in proportional systems at the local level, parties oftentimes depart from coalitions they participate in at the national level, and sometime they run under different labels. It is therefore hard, in a large sample, to control for these contextual factors, which makes the choice of national elections more appealing. A way of adjusting for these potential discrepancies would be to take a sample of municipalities where the party in question (whether the Northern League, the BZÖ or the FPÖ) ran in the same way.

Voting for such parties also represents very much the prominence of the issue, of their political agenda, and whether they are able to conquer a political space that identifies them as the clear choice for those voters that consider immigration a primary concern. That makes across time comparison hard even

elections), and the results went into the expected directions: lower BVPI scores meant a higher probability of having a BNP councilor elected.

while keeping the national context constant. That is a methodological issue that makes either choice of electoral data, national or local, problematic. Of course, the BVPI survey, as any survey, also suffers from limitations. Its format makes it much easier to perform comparisons across space and time.

Because of these methodological differences, my UK analysis does not compare exactly with the Italian and the Austrian case. Nonetheless, compare we will. In the UK, I found that Labor's diversity efforts might be misguided. My results paint a different picture than the final report of the UK Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC, 'Our Shared Future', 2007), which reported that *'79% of people agreed or strongly agreed that people of different backgrounds got on well in their local areas'*. The report uses an annex question of the BVPI survey, and their data are more recent (2005). That notwithstanding, when the report goes into details, the picture is not as rosy as it first looks. First it qualifies that low cohesion does not always depend on deprivation (on what, then?), then it remarks that *'diversity can have a negative impact on cohesion, but only in particular local circumstances'*, and that the areas going through those problems are a) new to diversity, often through internal UK migration; b) rural areas new to diversity because of Eastern European immigration and c) ethnically diverse urban areas experiencing new migration from non-commonwealth countries. My research indeed shows that higher diversity corresponds with lower citizens satisfaction with their municipality.

I remind the reader that my data do not allow me to measure the impact of Eastern European migrants (because it pre-dates it), and the BVPI question that I

utilize is more general, but the general patterns at the municipal level paint a picture that primes municipalities, especially in already diverse areas, for that kind of reaction. Also, my findings highlight that much of the dissatisfaction comes from local authorities (municipalities) where 'diversity' came from commonwealth countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, especially in already cosmopolitan areas such as London boroughs. New research will probably shed more light on these patterns of dissatisfaction. The recent gains of both the UK Independence Party and the British National Party seem to tell a different story than either the 2007 report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) or the 2005 report of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR Kyambi 2005). Conversely, my analysis shows that diversity does not lower citizens' satisfaction with opportunities for participation. In the UK, citizens do not seem to follow Putnam's (2007) 'hunker down' pattern of behavior, at least in its political side.

My findings also seem to suggest that citizens are quite crude in their assessment of who is a migrant or not. Maybe unsurprisingly, physical differences stand out. Even more than Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi, all Black ethnic groups are associated with lower satisfaction with the municipality. This fact does not transpire at all from either the CIC or the IPPR report. My analysis, as a whole, highlights that the presence of migrants and/or non-British descent citizens of specific ethnicities sends a negative message to native citizens about the state of their municipality. It is going to be interesting to see if Eastern

Europeans had the same impact on the municipality they moved in, especially since they spread all across the country (BBC, April 30, 2008).

Now that Eastern European migration is drying up and actually reversing the tide (BBC April 29, 2008) the UK is back to square one in many ways. The difference is that the government has taken some measures to address citizens' worries. It has taken the 2+3+2 approach to the admission of Romanian and Bulgarian EU citizens, and it has introduced a new immigration policy based on a point system (BBC, January 29, 2009). It is going to be interesting, for policy and for research alike, to see whether the integration of those Polish and Eastern European migrants who decide to remain will proceed better than what has happened for former Commonwealth migrants.

From my research I find that many municipalities still consider those former migrants as 'foreign'. More precisely, the presence of ethnic groups that are the most different from Anglo-Saxons coincided with more dissatisfaction with the municipality. That can be interpreted as a sign of rejection of foreign elements. Indeed, many of those foreign elements consider themselves as such. The 2006 PEW Global survey on Muslims in Europe found that 81% of British Muslims consider themselves Muslim first, and second, citizens of the country they live in; the reverse was true for only 7% of British Muslims. That was by far the higher percentage of such answer in all the European countries examined in the survey. The cultural element seems to be prominent in this kind of answer, and that is likely to provoke some tensions in UK communities (notwithstanding the CIC findings). An example of such tensions was the Muslim extremist protest against

the homecoming of UK soldiers from Iraq in Luton in March 2009 (BBC, March 13, 2009). On the other hand, moderate Muslims held a counter-protest against extremists in the same town just two months later (Daily Mail, May 30, 2009).

One question that comes from my findings, especially in the UK and in Italy, is the following: how much is the weight of racial against cultural differences? In both countries, racial difference seemed a much better predictor of negative attitudes toward migrants. My speculation for a causal mechanism of this phenomenon is that it might be not based on racial animosity, or at least not entirely. Even if citizens' worries in a given community are about cultural integrity (e.g. The opening of a new mosque as an event that disturbs the cultural integrity of a city), the way they see the presence of immigrants is still by looking at faces. Put in blunt terms, the darker the faces, the more culturally different Anglos might think they are, even though it is not necessarily true, especially for Caribbean Britons, for instance. As I will explain more into details later, future research will have to try to disentangle racial and cultural effects and explain the reasons for substantial differences across communities, which both my research and the CIC report hint at.

To sum up, after my research about the political reaction to immigration in the UK, I would highlight: a) a racial-ethnic element that comes out as the strongest factor in my analysis; b) a cultural element that does not appear nearly as strong as the racial ones, but that warrants further investigation at the local level, given the recurring episodes of tension; c) the weakness of economic factors in explaining reaction against migrants.

My findings in the Italy case were supportive of the UK case in important respects: there were some ethnic groups that sparked opposition more than other. Also, immigrants of African or Caribbean origin were again the group most likely to sparkle reaction, this time in the form of voting for an anti-migrant party such as the Northern League. These findings make an interesting comparison with the UK case, because again the racial/visual effect component seems to be dominant at the local level. This happened in Italy when the attention of the media was focused by far toward Eastern European and Middle Eastern migrants, and when from national surveys the migration-related worries of Italians were very much focused on small criminality (from Eastern Europeans) and menaces to cultural integrity (from Middle Easterners).

My results showed that local differences, both at the regional and at the municipal level, are extremely significant in Northern Italy. Not even immigrants of African origins have the same effect in all the regions of my sample when it comes to increasing the likelihood of voting for the Northern League. This somewhat squares with the 2008 CNEL (National Council for the Economy and Labor) report that stressed regional differences in the integration of migrants. The report highlighted that even though Northern regions provide migrants with better working opportunities, they were not as efficient at integrating them in the fabric of society. Future research will have to delve deeper into these local level variations. I will deal with the possible reasons for this finding in the section dedicated to speculations; for now, one possible explanation is that these

patterns might be political consequences, rather than being a driving force of political outcomes.

Another interesting finding is that communities in my Italian sample seemed to be able to distinguish amongst different ethnicities even in a positive fashion. From my data, which reported all nationalities of migrants, I created a group called 'other Asians', which included Filipinos, a long standing community in Italy back from the 1980s and other Asia-Pacific nations. Filipinos are as visually different from white Italians as any other ethnic minority in Italy. The presence of 'Other Asians', however, was negatively related to voting for the Northern League in six out of seven Northern Italy regions of my sample, differently from the main Asian group (which included Chinese migrants), which was positively associated with NL voting in four out of seven regions and strongly associated with it in the general sample.

It is tough to extrapolate a general lesson from this isolated and country-specific finding, but we can try to give some possible explanations. Even though they are visually different, the Filipinos are religiously homogeneous with the dominant population, since they are almost exclusively Catholic. The extent of how much Italians are aware about this is unknown though. It is also unknown how much this religious homogeneity influences native's perceptions. Filipinos are the first relatively big foreign community in Italy (Somali, Eritrean and Ethiopians were present from the decolonization era, but in very small numbers). They have specialized as service personnel for wealthy families in Italy since the 1970s, and their nationality has almost become synonym with

service personnel in the country (see King 1993 about labor specialization of immigrants in Italy). The religious homogeneity might help reduce possible conflict with the natives, but what about the rest? I will bring some possible explanations in the section dedicated to my speculations.

Another finding in the Italian case is that higher levels of internal migration decrease the propensity of a municipality to vote for the Northern League. This finding is consistent with the Austrian case, where more highly mobile places were less likely to vote for the BZÖ. The mechanism behind that could derive from the effect of bonding social capital (Putnam 1993, 1995, 1996, 2007): less dynamic communities might be less prone to embrace newcomers in general, which makes them even more likely to reject migrants. From Putnam's perspective cities that have relatively high bonding but low bridging social capital might have more problems accepting migrants than cities that have also high bridging social capital. We've seen that there are remarkable regional and municipal variations in my Italian case: that could make Northern Italy an ideal testing ground for Putnam's 2007 findings in the US.

Different from previous research (Coenders et al. 2003), and from my Austrian case, municipalities with older populations in Italy were less likely to vote for an anti-migrant party. This could come from religiosity. In Italy the official stance of the Catholic Church has been very welcoming toward migrants, always fostering solidarity. Older people, more likely to be religious, and more likely to be former Christian Democrat voters, might see the rhetoric of the Northern League as too confrontational for their taste. Still, the mechanism

behind this finding is not very clear, so it needs further research. In my Austrian case, on the other hand, municipalities with older populations were more likely to vote for the BZÖ, as previous research and intuitive logic would suggest.

Switching to education-related issues, my research yields similar results of previous literature (Gang et al. 2002, Coenders et al. 2003). While I have no significant findings from my UK case, in Austria I find that higher levels of university-educated citizens make municipality less likely to vote for an anti-migrant party. This might relate to factors other than immigration as well. The populist stance and the harsh in-your-face rhetoric of such parties might make them less attractive to a demographic that perceives itself (rightly or wrongly) as sophisticated. In Italy education did not seem to have an effect, but I could only use a measurement of high school diploma attainment, which other studies (see Hainmueller & Hiscox 2007) have actually found to be positively correlated to anti-migrant attitudes. In a revision of this research, it would be optimal to have university education attainment levels for Italian municipalities, so we can see its direct influence over the likelihood of voting for the NL and its interaction with other factors, such as the dynamics of citizens' turnover.

The Austrian case also brings noteworthy findings, even though the pattern of local variation is not as clear as it was for the previous two cases, though this may have been inevitable, given the smaller sample size of municipalities. The first observation regards parties. The BZÖ is the clear winner on the right of the 2008 elections, and from my research it appears that it was able to carve itself a political space to the right of its parent party, the FPÖ. In my sample, there is no

sign of municipalities going the way of the FPÖ for immigration-related reasons. Anti-migrant votes went the way of the BZÖ rather than the FPÖ, or at least immigration was not one of the main concerns of FPÖ voters. So the new Haider's party was able to claim those votes from its parent party². In a similar way, the NL in Italy has been able, at least in the North, to fill in the vacuum that National Alliance left open for anti-immigrant voting.

The explanation for this phenomenon in Austria is not as straightforward as it is for Italy. In that case, National Alliance progressively moved to more moderate positions about immigration, with its long-standing leader, Gianfranco Fini, even proposing, in 2003, the right to vote for migrants in local elections. According to Ignazi (2005), the political evolution of National Alliance in Italy resulted in its ideological repositioning vis-a-vis the Northern League: *'The void left by AN has been occupied by the Lega Nord [Northern League]. The Lega's more and more aggressive statements and demonstrations against foreigners and especially Muslim immigrants contrast with the soft attitude adopted by Alleanza Nazionale [National Alliance]'*.

In Austria, that doesn't seem to be the case. It is true that the FPÖ suffered an electoral defeat after it could not deliver on its promises during its stint at government, and that its image deteriorated in the eyes of anti-migrant voters (Heinisch 2003; Fallend 2004). That could have left a space for its 2005 splinter to dub itself as a go-to party for anti-migration policies. However, manifestos,

² It might have helped that in its 2008 election posters, the BZÖ sported Jörg Haider's image with the slogan 'Jörg Haider's list - The Original!'

programs, proposed legislation for the two parties look very much the same (Fallend 2008), so it is not clear at all that the FPÖ 'went soft', as it happened to National Alliance³. What I can report here is that the electorate in Austrian municipalities clearly saw a difference and voted accordingly. Probably the explanation lays in a Downsian argument about the positioning of the newborn BZÖ with respect to the FPÖ: given contextual and structural political incentives in Austrian, the BZÖ would obvious position itself to the right of the FPÖ, conquering the votes of hard liners of the former party rather than moderates.

Austria was a remarkable case also because for the first time EU migrants had some influence on the result, in an unexpected direction. I found that higher presence of EU15 migrants (minus Germans) actually made a municipality more likely to vote for the BZÖ, an effect that goes against my expectations of EU citizens actually taming the presence of other migrants (a sort of 'buffer effect' if you want). That is what had happened in the UK and in Italy. Not in Austria though. There can be multiple explanations for this phenomenon. If selection is the cause, then in Austria EU migrants tended to sort themselves into communities that already were anti-migrants, rather than more cosmopolitan ones, for reasons that I cannot explain with the data at my disposal. It could also be the case that municipalities that are already likely to vote for the BZÖ would take the presence of *any* non-German speaker as a menace to the integrity of the

³ For a survey of the party positions, see three Austrian party polls: Wahlkabine, Politikkabine and Wahlmaschine (Wiener Zeitung).

community and possibly competition for employment, therefore increasing the likelihood of such voting behavior.

Differently from Italy and in line with my expectations, older municipalities in Austria were more likely to vote for an anti-migrant party. This finding is consistent with previous research on attitudes toward migration in the EU. That might also explain in part of the effect of EU15 foreigners' presence. It could be that many of those voters actually recall the presence of poor EU15 migrants in their municipalities, especially Italians and Greeks, whose conditions and treatment were not better than current extra-EU migrants until the early 1970s (see, for example, Stella 2006).

The presence of Turks, one of the few nationalities data available from the Austrian census, on the other hand, was not statistically significant in determining vote for the BZÖ. This is an important non-finding, especially remarkable since the Turkish community appears to be quite concentrated in Austria. Through the expansion of my sample I might be able to explore if in smaller municipalities this presence have an effect on anti-migrant voting. Enlarging the sample of Austrian municipalities would also allow me to address across-state variations, which now I cannot fully explain. The one exception to that is of course Carinthia, where the leadership of the defunct Jörg Haider gave the party a boost. We can rule out an emotional effect though, because the death of the BZÖ's leader happened two weeks after the elections.

Lastly, we see that in Austria the welfare competition effect is actually negative: cities that have a larger part of the population dependent on welfare

are less likely to vote for the BZÖ. My sense here is that the traditional rhetoric and stance of the BZÖ against state wastes and corruption might have superseded welfare competition effects. Alternatively, it could be that higher level of welfare dependents in a city mean lower level of small business owners, which are traditionally one of the constituencies of anti-migrant parties (van der Brug & Fennema 2007). The next sub-section will summarize the bulk of my findings and their general relevance.

01b. The Big Picture

We oftentimes ask ourselves what the take-home message is. What's the big picture? Why should we care about this piece of work? The answers to these questions give us a research's take-home message. My research gives a variegated big picture.

First of all, the impact of different types of immigrants in European cities matters in a very simple and in a not-so-simple way. It is very simple in the sense that natives seem to take visual cues as a sign of immigration and they express their discontent accordingly. The presence of visually 'very different' migrants or even citizens is a signal to natives that immigration has changed their city. In this sense, natives may overlook subtleties in the assessment of who is a migrant and who is not and in their reaction to that.

On the other hand, the Italian case especially, and partially the Austrian case, suggest that the assessment of citizens is less crude than we would expect

given the previous point. The case of Filipinos in Italy, on which I will expand later on, is a signal that looks by themselves are not sufficient to understand the political reaction to immigrant groups at the local level.

The second qualification to the first take-home message is that a national-level analysis hides enormous variations at the local level. It would be a mistake to simply say: 'the darker the skin of migrants, the stronger the reaction of citizens'. My research shows that across-city and across-region variations of such reactions are very large. Not only are they very large, but also against common wisdom, as in the case of the UK and of Italy. As I pointed out in the introduction, by burying the local level in a Bell curve, we miss out extremely important variations that can inform us about the politics of immigration in the environment that matters the most for citizens. That is a point in favor of the use of the city as level of analysis.

A further message is that institutional structure (as other scholars have found) shapes the opportunities of anti-migrant parties, but citizens' discontent will find its way up. My UK case is a demonstration of this. Anti-migrant parties such as the UKIP or the BNP suffer from a first-past-the-post electoral system that limits their success at the national level and that stifles the political expression of citizens' anti-migrants discontent. My results show that discontent with migration will manifest itself, even though the national opportunity structure stifles its political expression. For example, the BVPI results highlight citizens' discontent with conditions in their cities and its relation with immigration and diversity. The UKIP and BNP performances at the 2009 EU Parliament elections, with a much

more permissive electoral system would look like a corroboration of this assessment. In retrospect, one of the readings of my research is that discontent was brewing at the local level, and the UK national opportunity structure only delayed its manifestation on a larger stage.

The next section will assess strengths and weaknesses of my research.

02.Assessment

Strengths

This research is one of the first stabs at trying to assess the political reaction to migration at the local level in the European Union, but of course it is in many ways imperfect and incomplete. I will now highlight its strengths and weaknesses, so future research can build upon it.

My focus on the city as a level of analysis is definitely one of the strengths of this research, though in this incarnation is still rather rough around the edges. The city is an important environment for assessing the impact of immigration because it contains most of the context in which citizens exchange opinions about politics. It is also the environment where citizens see the actual effects of immigration-driven demographic change. It is not a case that my research showed that the most dynamic municipalities in terms of people's turnover are also the ones that tend not react negatively to migration. This leads us to another

advantage of the focus on the city: it allows us to whether there are variations at the local level and, once we've spotted them, proceed to research the reasons of those variations. What is it that makes a community more or less welcoming of migrants? Or, conversely, what is it about group of migrants XYZ that makes them likely to integrate in a city but not in another?

The present research is just a current stab at grasping the extent of city-to-city variations in reaction to migration. However, if we assume that the city is the main environment for transmission and discussion of political ideas, then it makes sense to focus our research at that level of analysis. With more detailed data and larger samples, then we can try to assess the reasons for across-city variations and for regional differences as well. In a way, and I will expand on this later, such an expanded research on immigration can overlap and serve investigations on identity as well.

Also, if we consider the role of the city environment in the transmission of political ideas, then we should see the city as one of the best environment to explore the role of social capital in the politics of immigration. Putnam's study (2007) of American metropolitan areas is a first step in the right direction. My research lacks the whole array of indicators that I would need to delve deeper in the influence that social capital has on the political reaction to immigration. Nonetheless, my results on the relevance of citizens' turnover in Austrian municipalities could be a hint that cities that have high levels of bridging social capital might also be the most accepting of immigrants. The possibilities of this

line of research are vast, and social scientists should explore them more thoroughly.

The focus on anti-migrant parties is also a strength of my research. Their performance is an indicator that translates citizens' attitudes in actual political choices. Anti-migrant parties have also been quite explicit in their exploitation of citizens' attitudes. Their platforms, electoral campaigns, as well as their policy stances, have been quite consistent on the topic of immigration in the last decade.⁴ It was interesting to see that the stance on immigration was one of the boosters of parties such as the Northern League or the FPÖ (and the BZÖ) that seemed to have run out of steam for a while. These parties' consistent stance about immigration allows me to measure anti-immigration attitudes with the most political measurement: votes.

My research is one of the first to use BVPI data to explore the reaction to immigration in communities, the first so far outside UK scholarship. The BVPI survey is a standardized instrument, which allows me to perform a statistically reliable comparison across cities. An instrument like that is definitely a valuable tool to help researchers and administrators understand where a city stands. Also, the BVPI survey is performed every two years, therefore social scientists can use it to perform dynamic analyses, which in the case of migration are sorely needed right now. Even though the BVPI survey is a UK National Statistics instrument, I think that there is a strong case for exporting its utilization all across Europe.

⁴ A look at the electoral posters of the Northern League and of the BZÖ can dispel any skeptic's doubt about that.

These data would be an invaluable help for administrators and social scientists all around Europe.

As reported in the previous section, one of the strengths of my research is also its mix of intuitive and not-so-intuitive findings. That comes from the inclusion of variables aimed at controlling for other effects such as sociotropic economics effects, ideology effects, and, of course, demography-related effects. That notwithstanding, I was able to keep my models quite parsimonious. That is one of the problems with the research on immigration and with political research in general: social science researchers are aware that there many factors that influence political choices, but it is not possible to include them all without diluting our findings. Here I tried to strike a balance between comprehensiveness and parsimony.

As far as findings go, we see that the issue of political reaction to immigration is even more complicated than I expected. In both the UK and Italy, we see that even though the same specific ethnicities might be under the media's spotlight, citizen perception of the immigration problem may come from appearance. In Britain we saw that even though UK cities are nominally more concerned about Muslim migrants, then it is Blacks (not necessarily immigrants, but of foreign origin) who signal citizens about 'the problem' with their presence. Britons might be worrying more about one ethnicity, but in reality it seems that mere external appearance makes a difference. In Italy, we see a similar pattern: some ethnicities inspire cities to vote for the anti-migrant party. Again though, it is not immigrants from the ethnicity under the limelight (Romanian)

that cause this voting shift, and not even those under continuous observation for threat to cultural integrity (Muslims); it is the presence of Africans that causes that shift. Again, here they are a signal for the presence of migrants in general. My discussion of Filipinos in Italy though shows that this 'signaling' pattern may be more nuanced. My analysis so far cannot explain what lies behind these nuances. Nonetheless, it shows that there is considerable variation even in the natives' assessment of differences amongst migrants.

For social scientists, that creates an interesting puzzle on how to unbundle these notions and perceptions of immigrants that the native public has. The Italian and the UK cases are quite pertinent. If asked, I bet that most Britons and Italians would rank their worries about specific ethnicities and migrants in their country in a way that does not really match with their subconscious attitudes. That is a really interesting puzzle for targeted surveys? Once we know that such discrepancies exist, how can we adjust for that? Should we?

Weaknesses

My research also has several weaknesses. So that could serve as guidance for myself and for other researchers who might want to pursue the topic of political reaction to migrants. While my focus on the city as unit of analysis has its strong points, it also has its weaknesses. One comes from the availability of data. From all the national statistical institutions I have consulted, municipality-level data is not as readily available as national and regional level data.

Sometimes that comes only with the Census, making the use of dynamic models at the city level problematic. It also pushes social scientists to use a-synchronous data for static models, as I did, which raises questions about the reliability of estimates.

Sample size is another methodological problem. In my Italian case I was able to perform cross-regional comparisons, which revealed remarkable regional differences. In the Austrian case, my sample size did not allow me to perform such reliable comparisons. In a federal (like Austria) or a quasi-federal (like Italy) setting, cross-state or cross-regional comparisons are essential to spot spatial patterns, and possibly the origin of such patterns. Without a substantial sample size, those comparisons become unreliable. The availability of data, as mentioned above, actually compounds this problem of cross-regional or cross-state comparisons.

Also, pending the availability of data, the most appropriate model to use in this situation would probably be a multi-level approach that can encompass the individual, the national level, and everything in between. As in Putnam's 2007 analysis, geo-coded personal interviews in all or a sample of EU nations would yield extremely useful data in order to assess the variations of attitudes toward migration. It is true, however, that gathering this kind of data would entail a substantial effort. However, as the survey that Putnam uses was performed during the census, other National Statistics agencies in Europe could attach it to their standard surveys. The problem of time inconsistency would continue, unless those agencies decide to synchronize their census rounds. Also, if actual

political choices are what we are interested in, answering a survey is not exactly the same as voting.

Speaking of voting, even though using votes for anti-migrant parties has its advantages, it also has its drawbacks. First of all those parties, which we dubbed extreme right-wing populist parties at the beginning of this research, have flexible agendas. Both the Northern League and the FPÖ, for instance, were first pro-EU, and now are anti-EU; as far as migration goes, the Northern League was much more anti-South in origin than it was anti-migration. In sum, these parties could be anti-migrants only as long as it convenient for them. The flexibility of political agendas is not a characteristic of such parties only, but they have been more elastic than other mainstream political formations, which might make comparison across election cycles more complicated than we would want.

Another problem with using the vote for such parties as dependent variable is that they are frequently also 'protest' parties (see Lubbers et al. 2002; Bale 2003; Van der Brug & Fennema 2007 amongst others). To the extent that they are protest parties, the vote against immigration can conflate with many other reasons for dissatisfaction with mainstream political parties. It is also remarkable that such parties try to keep their anti-establishment image even when they get access to government.⁵ Because of this feature, it becomes harder to assess whether a vote for such parties comes from anti-migration worries rather than

⁵ Anti-establishment stances are not exclusive to extreme right or left-wing parties: many prime minister or presidential candidates in established democracies try to ride the public discontent with [insert name of political

general discontent with the mainstream political establishment. On the other hand, former research (see Lahav 2004, for instance) and my Austrian case prove that voters may be more informed than social scientists usually assume. The electorate in Austria was clear in its identification of the party that could have the strongest anti-migration stance, the BZÖ. Also, usually such parties try hard to maintain their electoral promises on immigration policy when they are in office: see for example the 2002 Bossi-Fini law (n. 189) and the recent (July 2, 2009) Senate decree 773/B in Italy, and the above-mentioned BZÖ and FPÖ proposed legislation in Austria.

A further issue with the utilization of anti-migrant party voting as the dependent variable is that mainstream parties can 'hijack' their agendas to capture votes in specific electoral rounds. France is an example of that tactic. In the 2007 National Assembly elections, Sarkozy's UMP was able to wrangle voters away from the National Front by adopting a much tougher stance on order and immigration, so much that the National Front did not conquer a single seat in the National Assembly. We have to take into consideration though that the political opportunity structure in France (double turn election with a 12.5% threshold for the access to the second turn) allows for a much easier use of these tactics than in countries that have PR electoral law or/and geographic concentration of votes.

capital] to boost their chance of election when convenient. Populist rhetoric is hardly the exclusive domain of populist parties.

Specific to the Italian case, I have not considered another party that could have attracted potential anti-migrant votes: National Alliance⁶. I cannot determine then whether National Alliance was able to win some of the anti-migrant votes. As I stated in my Italy chapter, the reason I decided to exclude National Alliance from my research is that they ran under the same ticket with Berlusconi's party, Go Italy. That made it even harder to discern the type of voting that this ticket was attracting. Given the party's campaign, my findings and the mentioned previous research about voters' information, my choice is fully defensible; however, having a comparison with models that include other potential rival parties (in the sense of the capacity of attracting anti-migrant voters) would have strengthened my results.

Some other potential issues with my research design derive from the incomplete consistency of models across my case studies. That depends largely on the sources of my data. National Statistics agencies collect similar data, but not exactly in the same fashion. This issue is common to studies that build data sets from various sources. This said, the comparison across my case studies should be taken with a grain of salt: better data would definitely improve the consistency of my findings. Also, the most noticeable difference between the UK and the other two case studies is the different independent variable: BVPI responses for the former, anti-migrant parties voting for the latter. My approach was to use the instrument most likely to capture anti-migrants attitude at the

⁶ Note that after the 2008 elections this party merged with Berlusconi Forza Italia (Go Italy) to form the Party of Freedom (PdL - Partito della Liberta').

municipal level, hence the discrepancy in my choice. The political opportunity structure in the UK penalizes farther-from-the-center parties far more than what happens in Italy or Austria. One way to obviate that though would be to use local instead of national election data, which I plan to do in the future.

Some of the independent variables that I use in my models are arguably not the best choice for getting at the effects I want to explain or control. I acknowledge this issue and also acknowledge that this limitation renders a comparison of my study with other research on the same topic harder. Better data collection in the future should limit the relevance of this issue, which always arises if data sources and processing methods differ from study to study though.

I hinted at the problem with capturing anti-migrant attitudes in a static fashion. My research suffers from this limitation. Even though I used change data in many of my variables, my results are still limited to a snapshot at a given point in time. Since my research is an exercise in comparative statics, it suffers from the same limitations as other studies that use a similar approach (see chapter 1 for a literature review of such studies). This creates concerns about a) the portability of study's findings (see below); b) the policy relevance of such findings, especially over the long term. As Putnam (2007) points out while investigating the effects of diversity in US communities, it is problematic to expand the relevance of research if we limit ourselves to comparative statics, given the inherent dynamic nature of cities and communities in general. The next section of my conclusions will address this and other issues with proposals for future research.

03.Future Research

This research can be improved in countless fashions to make it more accurate, more relevant and more portable. It also suggests other venues of research that can potentially explain other sides of the immigration issue in the European setting, both at the local and at the national level. Here I will focus on what I think would be the most productive directions of future research on political reaction to immigration.

One of the obvious evolutions of this stream of research would be the standardization of models. In very much the same fashion as Comparative Political Economy, Comparative Politics' research on immigration should strive to achieve 'normal science' status, when researchers have ready-to-use models that have proven their reliability and effectiveness. Even though this evolution is desirable from a philosophy of science standpoint, it might be problematic from a methodological point of view. We have seen that political reaction to immigration varies considerably according to context, especially if we take the city as a unit of analysis, and we've also remarked that context changes with time. It is not going to be easy to develop models that meaningfully take into account variations across time and space.

Using anti-migrant parties' performance as a dependent variable might be a strength in my research but it might also be an obstacle to its expansion (see also Fennema 1997). First of all, their presence and prominence on the political scene vary considerably across the European Union (Bale 2003, Ignazi 2005).

Second, their political fortunes also fluctuate considerably (Fallend 2004), also for reasons other than the prominence of migration on the domestic political agenda. Third, the variation on the political opportunity structure of EU countries influences the first two issues, even though not as much as social science theories would expect (see Jackman & Volpert 1996; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer & Carter 2006). I acknowledge these limitations of the use of anti-migrant parties in immigration-related research. However, that dependent variable has the advantage of having the most immediate connection with political choice: it is a political choice.

Ideally then, social scientists should have a survey that also includes voting intentions. An ideal multi-level model would include a survey from a large individual sample spanning across cities and regions (or states), coupled with local level data, voting intentions at the individual level and election data at the local level (see also Kitschelt 2007). All of this should have a sample large enough to account for local variations *and* be replicated across time and countries. This for the quantitative part only. Qualitative research to complement such a quantitative study would entail even more resources. Clearly the collection of such data would be problematic and time-consuming to say the least, but that is what social scientists should strive for.

The construction of a dynamic model is probably the most challenging aspect of this field of research. The use of comparative statics is problematic because the political, social, and demographic fabrics of a city vary with time. In this respects, the European context is less dynamic than, say, the US or the Third

World, especially at the city level. This slow-moving pace of change of European cities though has come into contact with fast demographic change in the shape of immigration. Politics and policies have been slow to adapt, but in the end they did. The social consideration of immigration has also changed over time. These factors change with demographic and change society themselves. It can be hard to trace a neat causal direction in these processes, but we must try to gauge the dynamic side of immigration politics.

Another issue is that immigrants might come and go quickly, given changes in the economic and political situation in the sending or in the receiving countries, but immigration policies do not change at the same pace. One example: Eastern Europeans, especially Polish, migration to the UK has dried up and reversed in the past two years (BBC, April 29, 2008). Dynamic models should take these trends into consideration, and also adjust for their variation across cities, regions and countries.

This leads to the questions about the portability of my research. I will address this from two different angles: portability across a) time or b) space. It should be clear that since waves of immigration vary over time, we should be very careful in addressing the contextual factors that can change the issue of immigration in different time periods. In all nations, the place of immigration on the political agenda varies over time, and so other contextual factors that can change anti-migrant parties electoral performances.

One of the advantages of using the BVPI survey in the UK is that this instrument is less prone to those contextual factors than anti-migrant parties

electoral performances. Recall that such performances may vary considerably also accordingly to leadership factors (see the NL performances when Umberto Bossi, its leader, was ill). BVPI scores should not suffer as much from those kinds of limitations. Also, BVPI surveys are repeated in the same fashion on two-year basis, which makes them attractive to build dynamic models.

The performance of anti-migrant parties suffers from the above-mentioned limitations. On the other hand, they are definitely the most direct expression of political discontent with demographic change that comes from migration. The portability of such models on a more expanded time horizon will need to adjust for contextual factors that vary across elections.

The portability of this research across space is somewhat problematic but could potentially be very rewarding. The first obvious problem is that the BVPI survey is a UK-only instrument. Pan-European surveys such as the Eurobarometer or the ESS do not focus on the city level, which means they miss the variegated nature of the political response to migration at the local level.

The performance of anti-migrant parties' also suffers from portability issues, but those can be addressed. First of all, institutional structural constraints vary considerably across European countries', with some electoral systems (e.g., UK, France) penalizing such parties much more than PR systems. One way around this could be to use the level of elections that present the lower threshold for anti-migrant parties. EU Parliament elections, for example, present weaker institutional constraints EU-wide than national elections. Even though electoral systems are not standardized, raw data on the number of votes by municipality

could constitute a good first step for the expansion of this research across space. The recent EU Parliament round constitutes an encouraging signal in this respect. A dynamic multi-country model could use anti-migrant parties electoral performance over EU elections, with data at the local level then. The problem in that case would be the disconnect with local politics. A potential solution could come from a dynamic multi-level model. Given the potential complexity of such aggregation, it might be advisable to use a sample of metropolitan areas across the EU in that case.

Related to the issue of dynamic versus static models, there is the problem with attitudes themselves. They may not remain static across time and space. They might also change with respect of the same group in different periods, in an interactive fashion. For instance, Filipinos have traditionally been one of the most well-liked immigrant group in Italy. Would it have been the same if they had migrated in Italy later? Would it be the same if they had specialized in a different kind of trade? Does prolonged and tight contact with locals help with mutual trust? Recall that Filipinos in Italy mostly work as full- or part-time housekeeping personnel, which entails a certain level of trust on the natives' side and daily contact. Future research should look at the specialization patterns of immigrant groups and assess whether different work environments make a difference for tolerance and/or integration. Religion might also be another explanatory factor. Would it be different if Filipinos were of a religion other than Catholic? Comparison with migrants specializing in the same trade elsewhere might help answering this question.

It is extremely hard to answer all these questions. It is hard to control for changes in attitudes toward immigration across time (for cross-country variations, see Malchow-Møller et al. 2009). Do cities change in the way they accept or reject migrants? Cities around the world have gone through waves of immigration. Future research should aim to highlight similarities and differences in the way European cities and metropolitan areas have reacted to different waves of migrants, in a similar fashion to what historical research has treated waves of migrants across Europe (see Messina 2007), and it will also have to unbundle its effects at the city level.

My research also poses a puzzle for political psychology. We have seen that, especially in Italy, the declared attitude of citizens toward specific group of migrants does not really translate in political choices unless other ‘more different’ ethnic groups, which signal migration in general, are present. Translated in layman’s words, voters in Italian cities were supposed to have animosity against Middle Eastern and Eastern Europeans, but it was the presence of immigrants of African origins that tilted them to vote for the Northern League. Political psychology will have to conceptualize this finding in a more rigorous way.

I believe that one of the most promising venues of research for the future is the incorporation of the social capital framework into the scholarship on attitudes toward migrants. If social scientists are able to collect data at the local level, that might be a viable path to a better understanding of the interaction of migrant groups with their host community. Using the social capital framework with appropriate data in a multi-level analysis could explain: a) what are the

characteristics of a community that make it better or worse at integrating migrants; and b) what are the characteristics of groups of migrants that make it better or worse at integrating in a given community. This could tell us about what combinations of communities and migrant groups are the most or least likely to produce conflictual situations.

The 2009 CNEL report on the integration of immigrants in Italy and its cross-regional analysis are some of the first steps in that direction, yielding interesting results. The report focuses on economic indicators, and explains how some of the richest regions and provinces in Italy (mostly in the North) are good at integrating migrants in the economic fabric of their communities in absolute terms, but Southern regions, though less efficient in absolute terms, are better at bringing immigrants' economic conditions closer to the native population.

The politics of local variations in the response to immigration is one of the most promising venues of research for social sciences. Delving deeper into the determining factors of such variations can lead to a better understanding of the interaction between migrant groups and local politics. There can be several levels of aggregation for such analysis. I dealt with the city level and the regional level (in Italy), but the metropolitan area (NUTS-3 in the EU classification) also could be promising. Using the metropolitan area as level of analysis could tell us how political reaction to immigration vary across municipalities in the same area, which could in turn highlight a) how migrants that provoke such reaction sort themselves and b) how municipalities in such area react to such sorting.

With that in mind, it is my sense that bringing the social capital framework into such an analysis could help explain how well communities integrate migrants in their socio-economic fabric. Keeping normative considerations outside of such research would not be easy, but performing a Europe-wide study could tell us much more about the interaction of migrant groups with the communities they live in, so that is a venue of research that I intend to pursue in the future and that social science in general should take into serious consideration. The next section will address the possible policy implications of my research.

04.Implications

My conclusions have now gotten to the point of 'so what?' What are the implications of my findings? My empirical findings tell us that the political reaction to immigration varies considerably from place to place. In one of the recent EuroBarometer surveys, a majority of EU citizens expressed the opinion that the EU take care of immigration policy, rather than national states alone. Given what I found from my research, I would dissent with the public's opinion. My fear here is that by delegating immigration policy to the EU, countries, regions, municipalities, would have even less controls on immigration. Variations at the local level would suggest that the capacity of cities, metro areas and regions to absorb immigration without provoking a political reaction varies substantially. Also, the same ethnic groups provoke different reactions according

to the place they end up settling. Ideally, municipalities and/or regions should be able to adopt their own quotas to adjust immigration levels to their possibilities and their needs.

This solution might not be achievable, at least not in centralized countries like the UK. It might be practicable in federal countries like Austria or Germany, at least when it comes to residency requirements. Also, municipalities or federal states might not want to take on the responsibilities for the implementation and control of local quotas. If EU states decide to go the EU route, then there should be some adjusting mechanism to adjust for the different absorption capacity of countries, regions and municipalities.

I have also shown that there are some ethnic groups that raise more worries than others, even though in practice it's not them who tilt voters to choose anti-migrant parties, but the most 'different' ones in terms of appearance. That could also be, and here I am speculating, one of the reasons why the public generally tend to overestimate the presence of immigrants. There is not much remedy for that though, unless when setting immigration quotas, a government resorts to racial features for the selection, which would be unacceptable.

We have seen that according immigration networks theory, migrants tend to cluster in specific areas, municipalities, neighborhoods, because they find someone of their same nationality, maybe even the same area of provenance, who can help them settle in the host country. With such a selection of more 'accepted' immigrants, the network effect of migrants once in the country could

grow exponentially, and in turn provoke a backlash against that community, which would defeat the purpose of such policy to begin with.

A point-based immigration system like the 2008 UK regulation might be a viable solution. It is indicative that the Labour government decided to adopt such a regulation following the overflow of Eastern European that entered the UK with the 2004 enlargement. The UK point system is aimed at serving the labor market, and therefore based on skills; also, it does not set an overall quota of immigrants that can be admitted under the point criteria, so it might not address public worries about migration. Recall that a 2008 Joseph Rowntree Foundation survey reported that Britons consider immigration one of the top 'social evils' of today's UK. The recent tightening of security and immigration policy in Italy is also trying to address public worries about immigration related crime, and the opposition has fiercely denounced the decree for allegedly carrying racial undertones.

The debate in the UK, Italy and especially Austria, underscores the debate about immigration policy in general in the EU. The public has many issues with immigration, and has also some categories of migrants that like less than other. As we've seen from my research though, there are discrepancies' in the public' perceptions of migration. How are governments supposed to address that? Should governments in the EU have admission quotas based on nationality? On ethnicity? On religion even? Let's remember that democracy is based on inclusiveness, but citizenship, which is the basis for participation in a democracy, is based on exclusion (Hollifield 2000, as cited in Fennema 2004).

As Fennema (2004) reminds us, government and the EU alike have tried to keep the issue as far from the public as possible, for the fear that democracy could turn into exclusionary populism. Maintaining this policy, however, will only delegitimize governments and European institutions alike.

The debate about inclusion/exclusion criteria will continue. The choice in the future might be for inclusive but anti-democratic criteria or for democratic but exclusive criteria. In the last two decades EU governments have turned a blind eye to the issues that immigration brings. The public reaction might make them swing the other way. Changes in regulation in the Netherlands, Italy and the UK, for instance, seem to point in that direction.

A possible solution to a general tightening of the screw might be to leave more autonomy to municipalities for integration policies. The involvement of communities in the integration of migrants is a fundamental element of the reduction of social conflict. It is already happening on a voluntary basis. The suggestion from this research would be for national governments to leave ample autonomy to regions and municipalities, without trying to superimpose a single structure and/or bureaucracy to integration efforts and community outreach. Needless to say, immigrant communities have to play their own part by engaging in future integration efforts, if integration is what they are looking for.

Many times in the news we have been reading about tensions between immigrant communities and their host citizens. According to bias of the coverage of the event, that looks either like an episode of racism and discrimination or an episode of immigrants' unruly violence. It is rare to witness

an event such as the anti-extremism protest that happened in Luton, UK, on May 30, 2009 (Daily Mail, May 30, 2009). The moderate Muslim community protested peacefully against Muslim extremist stalls in the street of that UK town, which is home to a sizable Muslim minority. A manifestation like this is important because a minority of extremists, violent or unruly elements in a migrants' community, oftentimes receive much more media coverage than their counterparts who just want to live peacefully in their host country.

If municipalities and communities of migrants are able to forge more effective partnerships, that might help integration efforts enormously. In sum, my suggestion would be to bring the source of the possible solutions to immigration-related issues closer rather than farther away from citizens. An EU immigration policy or, more generally, an international immigration regime, would probably make citizens feel even more powerless than they are now. Here I am not trying to suggest that community involvement would be the silver bullet to reduce immigration-related tension. However, it could help host and the migrant communities reach out to one another.

My study also has implications for social science. Most of political science research has treated anti-migrant parties with a mix of interested horror and contempt, branding them as neo-fascist political formations destined to disappear soon enough or to be opposed by any means. Kitschelt (2007), speaking of the research on extreme-right parties in Europe, claimed that *'the overwhelming share of social scientists who study radical right-wing parties is intensely hostile to their politics. In the first decade of research on radical right-*

wing parties, this passion often tainted the scholarly quality of research and theorising on this subject. Over the past decade and a half, however, radical right scholarship has substantially improved in parallel with (or caused by) a separation of practical value concerns from descriptive and theoretical analysis'. Immigration research in general suffers from a similar political bias in favor of immigrants rather than the host population. The public's immigration-related worries are branded in a negative manner.

This research, and the recent evolution of electoral politics in the EU should make us think about the issue in a more nuanced fashion. Fears and worries about immigration are not infantile reaction of people who do not understand the advantages and the bright future of diverse communities. They are legitimate concerns from both a cultural and economic standpoint. Branding these concerns as racist does social science no good for the understanding of the political processes behind them and of the parties that are taking the most advantage from them. After all, those parties, from my research and from the largest part of the current literature, are catering to specific preferences of the voting population. That those preferences do not reflect the politically biased consensus in academia does not automatically mean that they are illegitimate. Immigration research in general should evolve toward a separation of normative concerns and theoretical analysis. At the very least, social science should focus more on highlighting the economic and cultural trade-offs that come out of immigration in order to make it easier for decision-makers to take political decisions.

My findings have stimulated several reflections for which I have no answer, and still no research plan to tackle them: they are still at the speculative level. The next, and last, part will illustrate these speculations.

05. Some speculations

I will close my research with some speculations, for which I have no support data. I cannot claim any of the following statements to be true, I can only claim that those could pose interesting questions for the future of the research on immigration in Europe.

I will start with the UK. This country has had a longstanding tradition of immigration, even though the last wave has been larger and faster than any other immigration wave before. Could it be that the last waves of immigration from South Asia and then from Eastern Europe simply were 'too much' for the country to absorb without any social conflict? It could also be that the Eastern Wave came after a Muslim wave from Pakistan and Bangladesh that hadn't been absorbed yet, so that the native population did not have time to get used to the new faces that they saw. This kind of speculation could be extended to many Western European countries. In relative terms, they have gone through a massive wave of immigration in a short period of time. Also, let's not forget that European countries had stayed relatively homogenous for some time from the crystallization of European nation-states. Immigration, coupled with aging native

population, could have been simply 'too much, too quick' to absorb for Europeans.

The results of the 2008 Joseph Rowntree Foundation web consultation on social evils seem to lend some support to this hypothesis. Respondents identified immigration in the UK as a 'social evil' for a variety of reasons. Some participants defined current flows as "unchecked", "unrestricted" or "out of control", and had worries about the cultural integrity of their country. One of them worried that in Britain "there is so much diversity that we do not have common values anymore", another that multiculturalism "can cause friction and loss of common goals". Others were worried that "[immigration] will create a divided society and breeds contempt and jealousy between groups," while another respondent agreed that "indigenous inhabitants are becoming increasingly resentful and intolerant". Again, the evidence is scattered and mixed, but there seems to be a general feeling in Britain that immigration has been 'too much, too fast'. To put it in the words of one of the respondents, "the pace of change has been too fast for all cultures to be properly absorbed and integrated for the good of us all".

Another conjecture is about the evolution of the Eastern European wave of immigration. My research predates that wave of migrants. Also, that migration wave might self-absorb more quickly than anyone expected. Economic development in Eastern Europe on one side and recession in the UK on the other have contributed to the drying up of migratory flows first and their reversal afterwards. A 2008 Institute for Public Policy Research study (BBC, April 29, 2008) reported that of the one million migrants from Eastern Europe, half of them

had already returned home. There is no doubt that EU citizenship facilitates this kind of circular flows. We cannot have a counterfactual, but we can wonder if Poles, for instance, would have returned home so quickly from the UK had their status been different. Potentially, we could apply the same logic to Turks in Germany. Turkey's accession to the EU might bring a big inflow of Turks in Germany, but it might also allow them to go back whenever they want.

As for the Eastern Europeans who stayed in the UK, how well will they integrate? Will they also go back later or stay, as former Italian migrants in Germany or Austria, for instance? Will race be a factor in their favor? Southern European immigrants encountered strong opposition and discrimination (Stella 2006), but after a few decades their presence was not an issue any more; their offspring were fully integrated. Turks did not have such a good experience, partly because of their non-citizen status especially in Germany. Did that depend on ethnicity, religion and culture more than economic and legal factors?

Attitudes about different ethnicities change considerably over time. Take Italian-Americans, for example. There is ample evidence that natives considered Italian immigrants in the US in a very similar fashion, at that time, to African Americans (Stella 2006). Catholics were considered suspicious in general. That has changed enormously over time, so much that Italian-American is not even considered an ethnic group in the US. Will the same happen to immigrant groups in Europe? Is integration going to be much easier for the ones that are ethnically and culturally closer to their host country? Do Muslims in Europe face tougher challenges in that respect? Sartori (2002) remarked that *sic stantibus*

rebus Muslims as a whole are a tougher group to integrate in Western societies. There are countless signs of tension in Muslim immigrant or foreign origin communities in Europe, from Italy to the UK, from Sweden to Denmark. However, there are also some signs of change in those communities themselves. The above-mentioned Luton episode (Daily Mail, May 30, 2009) might be the sign of a general reversal of attitudes.

Regional and metropolitan differences also raise many questions to which we do not have answers yet. The above-mentioned 2009 CNEL report about geographic differences in the integration of foreigners in Italy. Are poorer communities better at integrating migrants just because the wealth gap between native and migrants is not as pronounced as it is in wealthier communities? If that is so, we could think of a sense of relative deprivation on the side of migrants and a sense of relative closeness on the side of locals as the driving forces for integration/separation. The higher the sense of relative deprivation, the more migrants would feel alienated from their host society, hence less likely to integrate. The higher the sense of relative closeness, the more locals would share the same interests and worries with the migrant population, therefore facilitating their integration. This kind of causal mechanism would go against conflict theory, which posits that competition for scarce economic resources should drive a wedge between groups in similar economic conditions. The closer in wealth migrants and locals are, the more they should get into conflict.

The Filipino community in Italy constitutes yet another puzzle for which we do not have a precise answer yet. Filipinos are Catholic, more religious than

Italians as a whole. They are ethnically very different from native Italians. They are not well integrated into Italian society outside of the realm of employment. All of this would suggest that their presence send the same message to natives of other ethnically heterogeneous immigrant groups. Yet, they are probably the most well-liked group of extra-Western European migrants. Crane (2004) sums it up: *'Research suggests that Filipinos' involvement with the Catholic Church has paralleled, or in many cases, surpassed that of Italians, but the Church has not necessarily acted as a meeting place for Italians and Filipinos. Furthermore, Filipinos' contact with Italians has essentially remained limited to employment. Filipinos constitute the most well-liked immigrant group in Italy, as they are perceived as being polite and dependable.'* From this and other research it looks like Filipinos are 'well tolerated' rather than truly integrated into Italian society. Is this as good as it gets for a recent immigrant group? Notice that Filipinos started migrating to Italy when multicultural policies were not even on the discussion table, so we can hardly think of any positive policy effects. Is that the best we can ask for an immigrant group in Western Europe? Is it unrealistic to think that it can get better than that?

My results about the Filipinos in Italy, though, are important also because of their specialization in a specific trade: housekeeping, many time in a full-time fashion. These jobs entail frequent and prolonged contact with natives. Not only that: they require a considerable amount of trust on the natives' side, because they entrust their houses, their personal belonging, and sometimes their kids too,

to their service personnel. What is it that makes Filipinos in Italy more trustworthy than other immigrant groups in the eyes of natives?

Now some speculations about anti-migrant parties. We have seen that they have been successful at taking advantage of the public's attitudes. We have also seen that they are more resilient than previous research (Heinisch 2003) found, in and out of government. The Northern League has maintained its radical rhetoric, and at the same time it has gone mainstream, reinforcing its position in the Italian party system. If anything, the recent merger between the former post-fascist party National Alliance and Berlusconi's Go Italy has reinforced its already dominant position for the anti-migration vote. Its flexible agenda and its anti-establishment rhetoric and policy initiatives expand its appeal well beyond immigration-related issues. My sense is that the party has consolidated its position, so it is going to remain a fixture in the Italian political system.

As we have seen, the BZÖ has performed very well in the 2008 elections, but it has prematurely lost its founding father right after that good performance. The 2009 European elections, the first without its charismatic leader, yielded a far less impressive result: 4.6% of the vote, with no seats captured.⁷ Could it be that the loss of a charismatic leader such as Haider has penalized the newborn party? It is early to tell, and it is probably impossible to make a fair assessment of the situation before the next Nationalrat elections. So far we can say that, yes, leadership is important for populist parties, but not very differently than what happens for mainstream parties (see van der Brug & Mughan 2007, whose

research does not find a disproportionate electoral effect coming from charismatic party leaders). If the BZÖ is able to defend the political space it conquered after the schism from the FPÖ, then it should be able to maintain its electorate, and even expand it. If its agenda is flexible enough, that it will be able to survive. Otherwise, once the migration issue slides away from media prominence, it will take a hit.

The situation in the UK is different because of the different political opportunity structure, but the immigration issue has definitely provoked a stir-up in the party system. This reaction is starting to translate into voting patterns when the constraints of the first-past-the-post electoral system are relaxed. The 2009 European elections saw the UK Independence Party becoming the second party in the country, surpassing Labour and Liberal Democrats with 16.5% of the votes and 13 seats. The more extreme British National Party got 6.2% of the votes and, for the first time, two seats at the EuroParliament. It is hard to predict how this trend will play out in the national elections; however, there is a possibility that the Tories move to the right to try to cannibalize the votes of more extreme parties, similarly to what happened in France with Sarkozy's UMP. The general trend so far is that anti-immigration sentiments are carrying the electoral results of non-mainstream parties: the next national elections will tell us how strong this trend is and how much it will influence British politics in the near future.

⁷ This European election round was the first for the newborn party.

Bibliography and References

- Anon. 2007. *Commission on Integration and Cohesion - Our shared future*. UK: Commission on Integration and Cohesion, June 14.
http://www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/Our_final_report.aspx.
- Anon. 2009a. *INDICI DI INTEGRAZIONE DEGLI IMMIGRATI IN ITALIA: Il potenziale di inserimento socio-occupazionale dei territori italiani*. Rome, Italy: CNEL, February 20.
[http://www.portalecnel.it/Portale/documentiAltriOrganismi.nsf/vwPerChiave/a52/\\$FILE/VI%20Rapporto%20CNEL%20Indici%20di%20Integrazione.pdf](http://www.portalecnel.it/Portale/documentiAltriOrganismi.nsf/vwPerChiave/a52/$FILE/VI%20Rapporto%20CNEL%20Indici%20di%20Integrazione.pdf).
- Anon. 2009b. Protest in Luton. *BBC*, March 13, sec. Politics Show.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/politics_show/7942744.stm.
- Anon. 2009c. Muslim extremists behind anti-war protest driven off by members of their own community | Mail Online. *Daily Mail*, May 30. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1189577/Muslim-extremists-anti-war-protest-driven-members-community.html>.
- Anon. 2009d. Changing of the guard. *BBC*, June 17, sec. People & Places.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/london/hi/people_and_places/newsid_8104000/8104835.stm.
- Arzheimer, Kai, and Elizabeth Carter. 2006. Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success. *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 3: 419-443.
 doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.x.
- Bale, Tim. 2003. Cinderella and her ugly sisters: the mainstream and extreme right in Europe's bipolarising party systems. *West European Politics* 26, no. 3: 67.
 doi:10.1080/01402380312331280598.
- van der Brug, W., M. Fennema, and J. Tillie. 2005. Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed: A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support. *Comparative Political Studies* 38, no. 5: 537.

- van der Brug, Wouter, and Meindert Fennema. 2007. Forum: Causes of Voting for the Radical Right. *Int J Public Opin Res* 19, no. 4 (December 1): 474-487.
doi:10.1093/ijpor/edm031.
- van der Brug, Wouter, and Anthony Mughan. 2007. Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties. *Party Politics* 13, no. 1 (January 1): 29-51.
doi:10.1177/1354068806071260.
- Coenders, M., M. Lubbers, and P. Scheepers. 2003. *Majority populations' attitudes towards migrants and minorities*. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, April.
Google Scholar.
- Crane, K. 2004. Governing Migration: Immigrant Groups' Strategies in Three Italian Cities Rome, Naples and Bari. In *Governance and policies in multicultural cities*. Economic Growth and Innovation in Multicultural Environments (ENGIME). Rome, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, February. <http://www.feem.it/NR/rdonlyres/6D92E1D5-F3B4-4727-A5C6-ADC8BBF58E41/1081/3704.pdf>.
- Fallend, Franz. 2004. Are right-wing populism and government participation incompatible? The case of the freedom party of Austria. *Representation* 40, no. 2: 115.
doi:10.1080/00344890408523254.
- Fennema, Meindert. 1997. Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe. *Party Politics* 3, no. 4 (October 1): 473-492.
doi:10.1177/1354068897003004002.
- Gang, Ira N., Francisco Rivera-Batiz, and Myeong-Su Yun. 2002. Economic Strain, Ethnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in the European Union. *IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor - Discussion Papers* 578. IZA Discussion Papers (September).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=331475.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe. *International Organization* 61, no. 02: 399-442.
doi:10.1017/S0020818307070142.

- Heinisch, Reinhard. 2003. Success in opposition – failure in government: explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office. *West European Politics* 26, no. 3: 91. doi:10.1080/01402380312331280608.
- Ignazi, P. 2005. The Extreme Right. *South European Society and Politics* 10, no. 2: 333-349.
- Jackman, Robert W., and Karin Volpert. 1996. Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. *British Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 4 (October): 501-521.
- King, Russell. 1993. Recent immigration to Italy: Character, causes and consequences. *GeoJournal* 30, no. 3 (July 1): 283-292. doi:10.1007/BF00806719.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 2007. Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Postindustrial Democracies: Advances and Challenges in Comparative Research. *West European Politics* 30, no. 5: 1176. doi:10.1080/01402380701617563.
- Lahav, Gallya. 2004. Public Opinion Toward Immigration in the European Union: Does It Matter? *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 10: 1151.
- Lubbers, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 41, no. 3: 345-378. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00015.
- Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj, Jakob Munch, Sanne Schroll, and Jan Skaksen. 2009. Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Attitudes Towards Immigration in the EU-15. *Social Indicators Research* 91, no. 3 (May 1): 371-390. doi:10.1007/s11205-008-9341-5.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life. *The American Prospect* 13: 65-78.
- . 2007. E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no. 2: 137-174. doi:doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.x.
- Sartori, G. 2002. *Pluralismo, multiculturalismo ed estranei*. Rizzoli, Milano.