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This semester (Fall 2008) I am teaching (at Denver University):

International Political Economy - INTS 4324



Here follows the on-line version of the syllabus. You can download a PDF version here.

Email: lapo.salucci@colorado.edu
Phone: 720-231-5441
Term: FALL2008

e-reserves: fall2008

Office Hours (Cherrington Hall 203): Wednesdays, 11-1:30, 5:00-5:50 and by appointment

I. COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course provides an introduction to the politics of international economic relations. The primary purpose is to give an overview of the field by exploring the theories that political scientists have traditionally used to analyze the origins of particular international economic arrangements. Much of the class is therefore devoted to lectures and readings that cover three standard modes of analysis in both international political economy and international relations theory: liberalism, realism, and Marxism.

The course has a second, equally important intellectual project, however. There is a significant difference between most economists and political scientists on the one hand and many sociologists on the other about what each field believes drives human behavior. Based on those different assumptions, the social sciences tend to diverge on questions concerning how we can study the social world. Thus we will also spend considerable time discussing the various assumptions that underpin theory. Finally, we will debate which of the approaches presented in the readings and lectures are the most convincing in their assessment of empirical problems.

Some of the readings focus specifically on contemporary issues such as tax reform in the UK and the US, Japan’s economic revival or the “global savings glut.” Our attention to policy issues will help students identify the ways in which IPE theory can help them evaluate and criticize current debates.

II. REQUIREMENTS

There will be a take-home mid-term exam (30%) and a take-home final (50%). In addition, some of each class is devoted to small group discussion and presentation of the groups’ findings. A synthesis of your presentations will be posted on the class’ blog, for everyone to read. Thus class participation will constitute 20% of the grade. If you feel uneasy at speaking in public, please email me your thoughts and I will post them on the class’ blog. Please note that I do not accept any late exams.

Also, please note that the content of this syllabus is subject to change, so check your email and the class’ blog on a regular basis to keep yourself up-to-date.


DEADLINES:
• Mid-term: by 1:30pm on Wednesday, October 1.
• Final: by 1:30pm on Wednesday, November 12.

III. READINGS

All required readings are on e-reserve except where noted; all other readings are available on Blackboard or through Penrose’s “Serial Solutions.”

Additional readings will be linked through the class’ blog, accessible through my website: http://sobek.colorado.edu/~salucci/. Students are required to consult the blog on a daily basis. The blog will also report comments and questions that you are warmly encouraged to send me during the week.

IV. CLASS SCHEDULE

Part 1: Introduction

1. September 10


Introductory lecture.
Review of syllabus and assignments.

2. September 10

Introduction and Overview: What is International Political Economy?

The Academic Debate:

Friedman, Milton. 1953. “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in his Essays in Positive Economics, 3-43. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Becker, Gary. 1976. The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3-14.

Swedberg, Richard. 1990. “The New Battle of Methods,” Challenge 33(1): 33-38.

Policy Implications:

Sachs, Jeffrey. 1995. “Consolidating Capitalism.” Foreign Policy 98(Spring): 50-64.

Soros, George. 1997. “The Capitalist Threat.” Atlantic Monthly 279(2): 45-58.

Optional Reading (a critique of Becker):

Rosenberg, Alexander. 1979. “Can Economic Theory Explain Everything?” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9(4): 509-29.

Discussion questions:

1. In your view, is there such a thing as “economic man” in the way Becker portrays the concept? What do the other authors of this week think the answer to that question is?

2. Is it useful and appropriate to apply the methods of scientific inquiry to the social world?

3. If there are two basic views about the nature of the social world and how to study it in this week’s readings, what are the public policies that logically derive from each view? Think about this question particularly in the context of advising developing countries in economic management.

3. September 17

History

Interest Groups and Economic Growth:

Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1-35.

Cameron, David. 1988. “Distributional Coalitions and Other Sources of Economic Stagnation.” International Organization 42(4): 561-603.

Property Rights and Economic Growth:

North, Douglas. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York. Norton. ix-xi, 3-58, and 143-157. Available on Blackboard.

Policy Implications:

Jones, R. 1999. “‘Time is right’ for mortgage relief to end,” The Guardian, 10 March. Available on Blackboard.

Lowenstein, Roger. 2006. “Who Needs the Mortgage–Interest Deduction?” New York Times Magazine, 5 March. Available on Blackboard.

Lowenstein, Roger. 2007. “Subprime Time: How did homeownership become so rickety?” New York Times Magazine, 2 September: 11-12. Available on Blackboard.

Optional Reading (the state and economic growth):

Spruyt, Hyndrik. 1994. The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 3-33.

Discussion Questions:

1. Why, according to Olson, do interest groups inhibit economic growth? Is it logical in your view that ironically, political stability might actually slow growth rather than enhance it, as Olson’s theory seems to suggest?

2. Is Olson’s theory falsifiable? Does it matter to the strength of his argument?

3. What kinds of gains from collective action are divisible and what kinds are not? How do divisible and non-divisible gains figure into Cameron’s argument?

4. Why, according to North, do property rights facilitate economic growth?
5. What roles do the state and ideology play in facilitating economic growth? Is North more closely aligned with Sachs or Swedberg on the question of whether economic policies are transportable across states?

Distribution of Possible Mid-Term Exam Questions.

Part 2: Competing Approaches

4. September 24

Varieties of Liberalism

Domestic Interests and Foreign Economic Policy:

Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company. 3-37.

Kindleberger, Charles. 1975. “The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820-1875.” Journal of Economic History 35(1): 20-55.

Ikenberry, G. John. 1992. “A World Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement.” International Organization 46(1): 289-321.

Policy Implications:

Blinder, Alan. 1987. Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Though-Minded Economics for a Just Society. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 1-31.

Discussion Questions:

1. What is the difference between economic liberalism on the one hand and a liberal theory of international political economy on the other? The contrast between Keohane and Nye with Blinder is helpful for answering this question.

2. Does the liberal compromise that Ikenberry refers to still exist?

3. How do liberals theorize a state’s interests? How does this differ from either realist or Marxist conceptions of state interest?

4. Is Kindleberger’s article a liberal analysis in the same sense that the other readings are?

Distribution of Mid-Term. The Mid-term is due no later than Wednesday, October 1 at 1:30pm in my office, Cherrington 203. I do not accept late exams.

5. October 1

Realism/Mercantilism

A Preference for Power over Wealth?

Krasner, Stephen. 1985. Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 3-58.

Lake, David. 1987. “Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North South Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 31(2):217-234.

Explaining State Strategies:

Gilpin, Robert. 1975. U.S. Power and The Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment. New York: Basic Books. 20-78.

Optional Readings:

Spiro, David. 1999. The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

Cohen, Benjamin. 1973. The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence. New York: Basic Books. 229-257.

Discussion Questions:

1. Why might states prefer to acquire power over wealth? Are power and wealth distinguishable?

2. According to this week’s authors, what constitutes the national interest? How are interests derived?

3. What evidence is there that the realist world view is correct? And if it is correct, how do we explain changes in the practice of imperialism or slavery?

4. What is the central difference between Lake and Krasner and which approach do you find more convincing?

6. October 8

Marx and His Descendents

Marx, Karl. From The German Ideology. In Frank Dobbin, ed. The New Economic Sociology: A Reader. Princeton: Princeton University Press (2004). 387-406. Available on Blackboard.

Structural Approaches:

Gill, Stephen and David Law. 1993. “Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital,” in Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations, edited by Stephen Gill, 93-124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1978. The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1-36.

Moran, Theodore. 1973. “Foreign Expansion as ‘Institutional Necessity’ For U.S. Corporate Capitalism: The Search for a Model.” World Politics 25(3): 369-386.

Instrumental Approaches:

Grabel, Ilene. 2003. “Ideology, Power, and the Rise of Independent Monetary Institutions in Emerging Economies,” in Money Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics, edited by Jonathan Kirshner, 25-52. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Optional Reading:

Gallagher, John and Ronald Robinson. 1953. “The Imperialism of Free Trade.” The Economic History Review [New Series] 6(1): 1-15.

Policy Implications:

Lewis, P. 1996. “Blood and Oil: A Special Report.” New York Times, 13 February.
Available on Blackboard.

Discussion Questions:

1. How do theories influenced by Marxism differ from realist theories?

2. What role do ideas and belief play in each of the readings assigned this week? What role does material power play?

3. Why are the readings this week characterized on this syllabus as either “structural” or “instrumental” and are these the correct categorizations?

4. According to each of the readings, do actors in the international system exercise their power by virtue of their wealth or through some other mechanism?


7. October 15

Economic Sociology

Sociological Perspectives on the Economy:

Smelser, Neil J. and Richard Swedberg. 1994. “The Sociological Perspective on the Economy,” in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, edited by N. J. Smelser and R.
Swedberg. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3-26.

DiMaggio, Paul. 1994. “Culture and Economy,” in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, edited by N. J. Smelser and R. Swedberg. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 27-57.

Cultures of Capitalism:

Dobbin, Frank. 1994. Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in the Railway Age. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Introductory chapter, 3-27.

Optional Reading:

Fligstein, Neil. 2001. The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First Century Capitalist Societies: Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 9.

Discussion Questions:

1. Why is it more likely that sociologists will focus on explanation and description rather than on prediction?

2. According to these sociologists, are actors rational in the sense that Becker assumes they are?

3. What would economic sociologists infer about policy transferability across countries?

4. What is cultural about the US economy?

5. According to Dobbin, what is the definition of economic efficiency?

Part 3: Issue Areas

8. October 22

Structural Change in the Global Political Economy

Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation. New York: Rinehart & Company. 3-30, 43-76, 130-150. [Corresponding pages in the recent publication of The Great Transformation, Forward by Joseph E. Stiglitz and a New Introduction by Fred Block are: 3-32, 45-80, 136-158].

Ruggie, John. 1982. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization 36(2): 379-415.

Frieden, Jeffry. 1991. “Invested Interests: the Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance.” International Organization 45(4): 425-441.

Policy Implications:

Bernanke, B. S. 2005. “The Global Savings Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit.” [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve] 14 April. Available on Blackboard.

Discussion Questions:

1. What is the structural change in the global economy that Polanyi is writing about and what are the origins? How is the rise of fascism and socialism related to it?

2. What does Polanyi’s “double movement” refer to?

3. What was the compromise of “embedded liberalism,” according to Ruggie? Does is still exist?

4. What comes first according to Ruggie—the economic or the social order?

5. With increased capital mobility, what have seen the politicization of exchange rates rather than monetary policy?

6. Are these analyses liberal, realist, Marxist or sociological in nature? Or are they some combination?



9. October 29

Varieties of Capitalism and Comparative Political Economy

Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 1.

Hall, Peter and David Soskice, eds. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press. 1-68.

Feldmann, Magnus. 2007. “The Origins of Varieties of Capitalism: Lessons from Post-Socialist Transition in Estonia and Slovenia,” in Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and Complementarities in The European Economy, edited by Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes and Mark Thatcher. Oxford University Press. 328-350. Available on Blackboard.

Optional Reading:

Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Response to International Economic Crises. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 17-68.

Fioretos, Orfeo. 2001. “Domestic Sources of Multilateral Preferences: Varieties of Capitalism in the European Community,” in Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, edited by Peter Hall and David Soskice. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 213-244. Available on Blackboard.

Policy Implications:

Emmott, W. 2005. “The sun also rises: a special issue on Japan’s economic revival.” The Economist, 8-14 October. Available on Blackboard.

Discussion Questions:

1. What are the main features of an LME and what are the central features of a CME? Where do they have their origins?

2. In light of globalization, is it likely that advanced economies will keep their distinctive features or is it more likely that we’ll see harmonization and homogenization?

3. What role does finance play in the analyses of Gerschenkron and Hall and Soskice?

4. Are states’ foreign economic policies shaped by their domestic economic systems?


10. November 5

The Political Economy of Security


Kirshner, Jonathan. 2007. Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 5 and 7. Available on Blackboard.

Kurth-Cronin, Audrey. 2002-3. “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism. International Security 27(3): 30-58. Available through Penrose.

Optional Reading:

Kennedy, Paul. 1984. “The First World War and the International Power System.” International Security 9(1): 7-40.

Keynes, John Maynard. 1920. The Economic Consequences of the Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe. 27-37 and 226-256.

Kirshner, Jonathan. 2006. “Globalization and National Security,” in Kirshner, ed. Globalization and National Security. New York: Routledge. 1-33. Available on Blackboard.


Discussion Questions:

1. Is it possible for a state to acquire wealth without also aspiring to develop commensurate military power?

2. When considering the causes of conflict, do economic factors necessarily play a central role? When would they and when would they not?

3. In what ways does globalization enhance or compromise states’ security?


DISTRIBUTION OF FINAL EXAM. THE FINAL EXAM IS DUE ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12 IN MY OFFICE BEFORE 1:30pm (CHERRINGTON 203).



Additional Issue Areas: not covered in this year’s course

International Monetary Relations

Eichengreen, Barry. 1992. Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939. New York: Oxford University Press. 3-66.
Kirshner, Jonathan. 1995. Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3-42.
Cohen, Benjamin. 1998. The Geography of Money. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 8-46 and 68-149.
McNamara, Kathleen. 1998. The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in The European Union. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1-12, 43-71 and 122-78.
Strange, Susan. 1998. Mad Money: When Markets Outgrow Governments. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 1-21 and 60-77.


Globalization vs. Internationalization

Ruigrok, Winfried and Rob van Tulder. 1995. The Logic of International Restructuring. London: Routledge. 1-35 and 119-51.
Kurzer, Paulette. 1993. Business and Banking: Political Change and Economic Integration in Western Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 3-23 and 217-54.
Vogel, Steven K. 1998. Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1-42 and 256-69.
Pauly, Louis. 1988. Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1-27 and 153-85.
Berger, Suzanne and Ronald Dore, eds. 1996. National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Introduction by Suzanne Berger, 1-25; Chapters by R. Boyer and R. Wade: “The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still the Century of Nations?” by Robert Boyer, 29-59; “Globalization and Its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy Are Greatly Exaggerated” by Robert Wade, 60-88.

On-Line Resources: Blogs

• Dani Rodrik’s Weblog: http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/
• Brad Setser: Follow the Money: http://blogs.cfr.org/setser
• Free Exchange (The Economist): http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/
• International Political Economy Zone: http://ipezone.blogspot.com/
• Grasping Reality With Both Hands: The Semi-Daily Journal Economist Brad de Long: http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/
• Economist’s View (Mark Thoma): http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/
• Foreign Policy’s Passport: http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node
• A Fistful of Euros: http://fistfulofeuros.net/
• Marginal Revolution (Tyler Cowen): http://www.marginalrevolution.com/